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eiv) 
A B S T R ACT 
The purpose of this thesis is to examine how productive credit 
can be applied to the problems of Ethiopian small farming, both to raise 
the leve l of productivity and to improve t he standard of living of the 
people . 
It is s hown that for these purposes Ethiopia can be di vided 
into two types of region - communal and individual tenure provinces. 
The communal tenure provinces have two key problems , tenurial 
and the pressures of population. The former has a deleterious effect 
upon individual investment incentives through the inalienability of land, 
and consequent proble~ of mortgage security and the insecurity of 
tenure. Population pressures affect the scope for producing saving and 
investment surpluses. 
Therefore f or these communal tenure provinces certain policy 
recommendations emerge. These involve altering methods of obtaining 
loans together with an emphasis upon repayments being deducted from sale 
proceeds . Credit should first be confined to the provision of improve-
ments of a land-saving nature and legislative intervention is also 
required to ensure the farmer use for this land for a minimum period 
after making these land-saving improvements. 
In the individual tenure provinces the key features revolve 
about problems of tenant 's rentals. Population pressures are here l ower, 
which allows the production of surpluses and also ensures that both and 
and labour-saving improvements increase the levels of production. 
For these provinces policy recommendations emphasise land 
reform . Or, if this is not practicable, they advocate tenure reform 
along the lines of fixed rents (at educed levels) instead of rents as 
a proportion of production: this latter with guarantees of tenure 
security. These reforms should ensure investment incentives as credit 
for labour-saving and land-saving devices will contribute immediate 
increases in productivity. 
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II 
FOR E W 0 R D 
This study is concerned with the potential rate of production 
credit to small farmers in Ethiopia as an instrument of economic 
development. In 1971, the population of Ethiopia was es timated to be 
nearly 26 million, of which about 90 per cent were rural people, mostly 
living on small farms. Broadly speaking, t hese small farmers fall into 
two groups distinguished by different types of land tenure and different 
levels of population pressure on land resources~ One group farms under 
a traditional system of heritable usufruct using land that generally 
speaking is overpopulated, overcultivated and of low fertility. The 
other group farms under a tenure system involving individual ownership 
and landlord-tenancy arrangement, but on land that is underpopulated, 
underut i lised and generally of high fertility. The aim of this study 
is to examine the implications of these two different sets of character-
istics for the form and quantity of credit that should be provided for 
in development planning. 
Statistics describing the rural sector of the Ethiopian economy 
are very scarce, and much of what has been made available from small 
sample surveys and the beginnings of statistical collection is of very 
limited use and application. The vast majority of agricultural produc-
tion is consumed on or near the farm and is completely unrecorded. 
Little is known about the size and composition of individual farms, and 
only a minute propor tion of farm lands have been surveyed or measured in 
any way. Even popula ion estimates are subj ect to serious margins of 
error, whilst statistics of arable land of various classes are guesses 
based on the broadest of assumptions. Apart from statistics of agri-
cultural production actually exported rom Ethiopia, and of agricultural 
(xv) 
plant and inputs imported into the country, the normal data on which 
economists base their analysis of rural farm problems are either 
unavailable or of such doubtful reliability as to be unusable for any 
responsible analysis of policy. 
These facts have presented the author of this study with some 
special difficulty. Much of the background one would like to have for 
the theoretical analysis cannot be supported by properly documented 
empirical data of acceptable quality. In many places I have felt com-
pelled to advise him to omit sections in which he had attempted to pro-
vide such support and documentation on the grounds either that what was 
available was of doubtful reliability, or that what was available (for 
example, some detailed information about tractors and field pumps) was 
not directly relevant to his subject. 
The result is that the study has finally taken the form of a 
theoretical analysis of the significance of two distinct levels of 
population pressure on land resources, combined with two different basic 
forms of land tenure and usage, on the rural credit needs for develop-
ment. The validity of this analysis, and of the policy conclusions 
derived from it, is not confined to Ethiopia, but would hold ceteris 
paribus for any country in which such conditions are found. 
Under these clrcumstances, the level of empirical documentation 
for the author's assertion that the conditions analysed apply in Ethiopia 
is necessarily somewhat sketchy, and more dependent than one would 
normally wish upon the personal knowledge and experience of the author 
of the study. This does not, however, detract from the theoretical value 
of the analysis, which is both original and a valid basis for rural 
credit policy wherever such conditions may be found. 
July 1975 E. K. FISK 
1 
FIGURE I. I 
MAP OF ETHIOPIA: 
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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION 
This study concentrates upon the small farmers of Ethiopia. 
Accordingly, this first chapter has a threefold purpose. Firstly, to 
provide the setting by outlining brief ly the Ethiopian agricultural 
scene. The major problems of small farmers are then discussed and the 
role of production credit is analysed. 
In the overview of the agriculture of Ethiopia we shall 
briefly describe the position of agriculture in the economy, the patterns 
of land usage, and the distribution of the population. This provides the 
setting whereby the position of the small farmer can be more readily 
understood. 
1.1 The Agricultural Economy: An Overview 
Agriculture has a key role in the development of the Ethiopian 
economy. The basic need is to increase production in order: 
(a) to raise domestic food supply; 
(b) to provide for increased and diversi fied exports; and 
(c) to provide raw materials for processing industries. 
The economy is largely dependent upon exports of primary 
products. Coffe e is the major foreign exchange earner, accounting for 
abou t 60 per cent of export income. Othe r agricultural products 
account for an additional 30 per cent of total exports . Fluctuations 
in cof fee prices have been a major cause of disturbances in the economy. 
3 
TABLE 1.1 (a) 
GROSS DOMESTIC PRODUCT BY INDUSTRIAL ORIGIN 1963, 1966 AND 1969 
AT CONSTANT 1961 PRICES 
(% dist ribution) 
Type of production 1963 1966 1969 
AGRICULTURE: 62.5 57.3 53.2 
Agriculture 59.3 54.3 50.3 
Forestry 3.0 2.7 2.8 
Htmting 0.1 0.1 
Fishing 0.1 0.2 0.1 
INDUSTRIES: 13.0 15.2 17 . 5 
Mining and quarrying 0.2 0.3 0.2 
Manufacturing 2.2 3.1 4.6 
Handicraft and small scale industry 4.1 4.6 5.2 
Building and const'ruc tion 5.9 6.4 6.4 
Elect ricity and water 0.6 0.8 1.1 
WHOLESALE AND RETAIL TRADE: 6.5 7 . 7 8.5 
TRANSPORT AND COMMUNICATION : 3.4 4.1 4.2 
OTHER SERVICES : 14.5 15.5 16.6 
Banking , insurance and real estate 0.9 1.0 1.1 
Public administration and defence 4.4 5.0 5.2 
Ownership of dwellings 4.2 4.2 4.4 
Educational services 1.0 1.2 1.7 
Medical and health 0.7 0.7 0 . 7 
Domestic services 2.1 1.9 1.7 
Others 1.2 1.5 1.8 
TOTAL 99.9 99.8 100 0 
Source : Central Statistical Office (1971). 
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The figures for Gross Domestic Product in Table l.l(a) include 
estimated production for own consumption but are not an adequate indi-
cation of the relative share of non-monetary activity. They are very 
rough estimates since most of the production is consumed on the farm and 
no tool for its measurement is available. However, Juther (1958) esti-
mated that the peasant mainly produces for his own immediate consumption 
and only exchanges 10 to 20 per cent of his output at the local market. 
Around 20 per cent of the peasant ' s crop is believed to be lost due to 
rodent and insect attacks and to lack of storage facilities (Food and 
Agriculture Organization, 1965). 
Livestock raising is a subsidiary act ivity of most farmers and 
nearly the sole livelihood of some tribes of nomadic herdsmen. Before 
the recent drought years of 1972 and 1973, a peasant's family, on the 
average, owned four to five head of cattle an d a few sheep and goats. 
At present, the average livestock owned is greatly reduced in some areas 
owing to losses incurred during the drought. However, livestock is still 
raised to provide milk and oxen for ploughing and is seen as a sign of 
wealth to serve as a means of saving. The animal wealth of the country 
in 197 0-71 was estimated at 26 million cattle, 13 million sheep and 
11 million goats (Central Statistical Organization, 1971). 
1.1.1 Land Usage of Ethiopia, 1970-71 
Ethiopia is a land of great variety, dominated by the Central 
Highlands , whose massifs, with high peaks rising up to 4,500 metres 
account for 18 per cent of the total land area. Tablelands of medium 
height account for another 20 per cent. Most of the rivers flow into 
deep gorges and cannot be used for irrigation . About 62 per cent of the 
land area consists of lowlands, which descend at one point as low as 
120 metres below sea level, and extend around most of the periphery of 
the ountry. 
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Ethiopia comprises 1,221.9 thousand square kilometres, classi-
fied as follows by the Central Statistical Office (1971): 
TABLE l.l(b) 
LAND USE OF ETHIOPIA 
Area 
Category of land 
'000 km2 % 
AGRICULTURAL LAND: 840.7 68.8 
(a) Cultivated land 134.9 11.1 
1. Crop land 106.5 8.7 
2 . Fallow land 21.1 1.7 
3. Fruits and stimulants 7.3 0.6 
4. Meadows 0.1 0.1 
(b) Pastures 654.0 53.5 
(c) Swamps 51.8 4.2 
FORESTS: 88.2 7.2 
BARREN LAND AND BUILT-IN AREA: 172.1 14 . 1 
WATER AND WATER COURSES: 120.9 9.9 
TOTAL 1121. 7 100 .0 
Source: Statistical Abstract, 1970, p.ll. 
Thus the data on the land use pattern in Ethiopia suggests that of the 
840,700 km2 of agricultural land, only 134 ,900 km2 are cultivated 
(Table l.l(b)). Only about 9 per cent of the total land is under 
crops, while about 54 per cent is under pasture. 
No information is available as 0 exactly how much land is 
arable and how much of this is really unutili sed. It is generally 
assumed that much of the pasture land could be used for the production 
of crops; however, in view of the large livestock population of 
Ethiopia it is extremely difficult to estimate the optimal amount of 
pasture land. All the same, it is generally believed that a large 
~'i\ 
-
TABLE 1.2(a) 
AREA, ESTIMATED POPULATION , POPULATION DENSITY, URBAN AND RURAL POPULATION 
AND SIZE OF HOUSEHOLD 1971 BY PROVINCE 
Population % urban Number of persons Area population 
Province (' 000 km2 ) ( f 000) in the per household 
Rural Urban Province Rural Urban 
Arussi 23 . 5 784 . 6 48.9 5.9 5.03 3.39 
Bale 124.6 666.6 26.0 3.8 4.28 
Begemdir 74.2 1234.8 90.3 6.8 4.41 3.30 
Eritrea 1 117.6 1497.6 392.1 20.7 3.79 
Gemu-Goffa 39.5 648.9 34.6 5.1 4. 26 3.35 
Gojjam 61.6 1622.4 89.9 5.2 4.47 3.02 
Harargie 259.7 3113.4 173.5 5.3 5.05 3 . 49 
I11ubabor 47.4 648.9 25.2 3.7 4.14 3.75 
Keffa 54.6 1582.6 74.1 4.5 3.94 3.62 
Shewa 85.2 4090.4 1119.3 21.5 4.97 3.79 
Sidamo 117.3 2300.1 124.9 5.1 4.80 3.76 
Tigre 65.9 1659.1 128.4 7.2 4.53 3.67 
We11ega 71.2 1189.1 52.6 4.2 5 . 03 3.82 
We110 79.4 2298 . 0 109.2 4.5 4.39 3.27 
TOTAL 1221.9 23336.5 2489.0 9.6 4.65 3.65 
Source: Central Statistical Office, 1971. 
1 . The population estimates are obtained from the National Sample Surveys except for 
Eritrea which is based on Ministry of Interior estimates. 
tm~CM;;a 
---
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amount of cultivable land remains uncultivated. Some of this is govern-
ment land but a part of it also seems to be in the hands of private 
owners. 
1.1.2 The Population of Ethiopia 
The total population of the country is estimated to be 
25,825,000 in 1971 of which 2,489,400, i.e., 9.6per cent, is urban. 
(Urban is here defined as a locality with more than 2000 inhabitants.) 
With a yearly growth rate of about 2.5 per cent, the population will 
reach 28.5 million in 1975 (Central Statistical Office, 1971). With 
nine-tenths of the people in the rural areas in 1971 (see Table 1.2(a)), 
agricultural policy is obviously of vast and direct importance to the 
bulk of the Ethiopian population. Reform in this sector is thus ger-
mane to any improvement in the living conditions of the mass of the 
people. And this, in the guise of reform of the provision of rural 
credit, is the focus of this study. New credit facilities will be 
advocated for the estimated four million small farmers of Ethiopia (see 
Table 1.2(b)). These f amilies have hitherto been unable to take 
advantage of such credit ins titut ions as do exist. I t has been esti-
mated by Holmberg (1972) that 85 per cent of these are small farmers. 
Hence, about 4 million of the 4,710,250 rural householders are small 
farmers; small farmers, s defined below, being those who cultivate 
less than 4 ha. 
1.1.3 Farm Mechanisation 
Farm mechanisation has taken place to some extent on larger 
sized farms of Ethiopia, but has only affected the small farmers, with 
which this study is mainly concerned, to the extent that it has dis-
placed some tenants and farm labourers. 
Details are given in Appendix A. 
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TABLE 1.2(b) 
ESTIMATED NUMBER OF SMALL FARMERS IN ETHIOPIA 
Rural Number of Number of ~ 
Province population persons per rural ~. 
('000) rural households household 
Arussi 784.6 5.03 155,984 
Bale 666.6 4.28 155,747 
Begemdir 1234.8 4.41 280,000 
Eritrea 1497.6 
Gemu Goffa 648.9 4.26 152,323 
Gojj am 1622.4 4.47 362,953 
Harargie 3113.4 5.05 616,514 
I11ubabor 648.9 4.14 156,739 
Keffa 1582.6 3.94 401,675 
Shewa 4090.4 4.97 823 ,018 
Sidamo 2300.1 4.80 479,187 
Tigre 1659.1 4.53 366,247 
I We11ega 1189.1 5.03 236,401 
We110 2298.0 4.39 523,462 
! 
TOTAL 23336.5 4.65 4,710,250 
Source: Central Statistical Office, 1971. 
1.2 The Problem of Small Farmers 
A small farmer is the cultivator of an area less than 4 ha 
irrespective of his land tenure arrangements. This is t he definition 
adopted by the Central Statistical Office. The bulk of rural house-
holds seem to have less than 1.5 ha und~r crops (as can be seen from 
Appendix B, Table B.l or Table 2.1). However, these and most other 
land statistics in Ethiopia underestimate the size of personal land-
holdings because they do not take the fragmentation of personal land 
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ownership into account. Ethiopia is a count ry of small farmers In a 
country so heavily dependent not only on agriculture but also on small 
farmers, the problem of small farmers become the problems of the country. 
The small farmer is beset by a number of difficulties which 
render any increase in productivity exceedingly difficult both to 
achieve and to profit from. The major impediments of an economic nature 
are capital shortages; problems of farm size and labour productivity; 
the land tenure systems of Ethiopia; the lack of transportation networks, 
and also a range of marketing problems. 
1.2 . 1 Lack of Capital 
The experience of other develop ing countries suggests that the 
"green revolution" can sometimes worsen the equity of rural income 
distribut ion by making the small farme r poorer and the larger farmer 
richer, unless the State takes strong measures to ensure that the bene-
fits are spread widely among the rural populat ion. The purchase of 
modern inputs, particularly capital equipment which cannot be amortised 
in one crop season, requires finance . The large farmer may have enough 
liquid assets to finance himself, or if not, can obtain the ne~ ssary 
credit from suppliers, traders or banks, using as security his land, 
other fixed asset s, livestock, or per haps nothing more than his repu-
tation. 
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Tenants and small landowners, on the other hand, do not have 
sufficient personal assets to finance the development of their holdings, 
and do not have assets in a form suitable to serve as collateral for 
private loans. The administrative costs of supplying a large number of 
small farme r s with credit in small quantities is much greater than that 
of supplying inputs in bulk to a few large farmers. For small farmers 
there is also a higher risk of loss and a much greater cost of debt 
collection . These are reasons why the private capital market, if it ever 
does lend to a small farmer, does so at a very high rate of interest. 
This means that where the small farmer lacks the cash resources to par-
ticipate in technological improvements, only the State can effectively 
provide it to him on credit at reasonable terms. This service, in effect 
a subsidy, will be dealt with in Chapter 5. 
1.2.2 Size of Average Household Farm 
The data available in Ethiopia is inadequate to support any 
detailed analysis of farm size, whether of small or large holdings. 
Some available details are given in Appendix B, where the shortcomings 
of the data are also discussed. What can be said, however, is that 
taking into consideration land fertility and population pressure on 
land resources, the effective size of small holdings in the "connnunal 
tenure" provinces (see below and also Figure 1 .1) i s much smaller than 
in the "individual tenure" provinces. 
1.2.3 Land Tenure 
Land tenure is the term used to describe the method by which 
land is owned, held or used by its human inhabitants . 
The overriding issue, affecting the Ethiopian farmers' 
economic environment and their will and capacity to increase production 
and raise incomes, is land tenure. Most Ethiopian farm families have 
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neither title to the land they work, nor a leasehold on terma which 
provide the necessary incentives to invest in land improvements and 
undertake innovative practices. This is a major obstacle to expanding 
the national output of farm products, quite aside from its effects on 
income distribution and social welfare. 
There are two main tenure arrangements: 
(a) Communal areas. These are lands which are 
farmed individually under usufructuary rights 
vested in the community; and 
(b ) Individually owned lands, over which title 
is sometimes restricted. (See Chapter 2.) 
The geographical distribution of these areas is shown in Figure 1.1. 
* In the communal areas of the northern provinces, i ndividual 
or family rights over land depend upon a claimant establishing a link 
with a founder of the village. Such rights over land are usufructory. 
Farms largely consist of several parcels or fragments, sometimes 
located at considerable distance from each other. No transfer of 
ownership and no mortgage or sale is permissible, but titles are 
always in dispute. Lack of incentive to improve the land stemming 
from insecurity of tenure is dominant. There is a high prevalence of 
land litigation~ No land registration of title exists. 
In the southern provinces individual o\vuership is usual, but 
the operators are commonly tenants. There is no law that regulat es the 
landlord-tenant relationship. Most of the agreements are verbal and on 
* The communal tenure areas are the provinces of Tigre, Begemdir, 
Eritrea and Gojjam. It includes also some parts of Wello and Shewa, 
but it usually refers to the first four provinces. 
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a share cropping basis. Not only are evictions common in some provinces 
but generall y tenants are thought to be unwilling to invest effort and 
funds beyond the minimum necessary to subsist. This reluctance is 
natural with a share cropping tenancy in which a considerable portion of 
the gain from extra investment must be turned over to a landlord who 
bears none of the cost or risk. 
The problems arising from land tenure can be summed up by 
saying that if we are to hope t o see sound forms of land use by everyone, 
a system of tenure must be devised in which it is physically possible 
and financially rewarding for a man to farm well if he wishes to. This 
is not the case in a great part of Ethiopia today . 
The two types of tenure will be discussed in detail in 
Chapter 2. 
1.2 . 4 Rural Roads . 
In a country t otalling 122 million hectares ,"there we re in 
1971 about 23,000 km of roads, of which some 8,000 km were all-se ason 
roads and the balance dry-weather trails" (Highway Authority , 1971). 
About 60 per cent of the Ethiopian population live mo re than half a 
day away (by mule) from a dry weather trail. 
Despite considerable development of the t rans port system ove r 
the years, the carriage of goods is still conducted overwhelmlngly by 
humans and by pack animals such as mules, donkeys, horses and camels . 
A modern transport system providing an effective l i nkage with the 
external exchange economy does not exist. This delays the proces s of 
monetization by setting a very much lower exchange value for produce 
for produce in rural areas than that obtained in urban areas. 
1.2.5 Agricultural Marketing 
The agricultural marketing structure has been defined to 
include all of those functions, institutional and individual, involved 
in moving commodities from farm to consumer. These include the supply 
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of inputs from the market, i.e., fertilizer, improved seed, pesticides, 
insecticides, as well as the handling of output (Ministry of Agriculture, 
1973). 
Within the agricultural sector, a most significant develop-
mental weakness has been the absence of an efficient marketing system 
which can stimulate both output and consumption simultaneously. Vi t al 
services, such as communication, extension services, production credit, 
etc ., have either not been available or did no t function adequately. 
The marketing system must reward the farmer wi t h a higher return f or 
his agricultural commodities than has traditionally been the case in 
Ethiopia, and also provide an assured market for surplus production. 
Also Ethiopia continues almost annually to face serious local 
crop shortages in some areas, while adequate supplies may often be 
available in many other areas. Many of the difficulties and compl exi-
ties of this problem take it beyond the pur view of agricultural marketing 
in the narrow sense. Nevertheless, a sensi tive and efficient marketing 
system would help direct s upplies to deficient areas. The fundamental 
probl m in such areas has generally been one of very low effec tive 
demand associated with very low cash incomes rather than deficiencies in 
the market structure, per see 
Low producer prices relative to those charged to consumers in 
the metropolitan areas have been the major agricultural marketing prob-
lem of Ethiopia. The causes are as fo llows : 
(a) The lack of marketing alternatives under 
competitive conditions, and great distance 
between markets considering the modes of 
transportation. 
(b) Inaccurate weighing and the lack of uniform 
units of measure with the attendant problems 
of grading, standards, etc. 
(c) Excessive price variations between places 
at different distances from the main trans-
portation facilities. Thus "high" farm-to-
market transportation costs prevent some 
farmers from getting as high a price as 
those who are closer to the market. 
(d) Excessive speculation and hoarding by dealers 
with resulting high prices at the consumer 
level. 
(e) Lack of credit, both short- and long-term, 
to finance inputs, inventories, etc. This 
forces farmers to sell immediately after 
harvest, when prices are lowest. 
(f) The weak bargaining power of the traditional 
farmer vis-a-vis the grain dealers. 
(g) Lack of reliable market information (Ministry 
of Agriculture Marketing Division, 1973). 
The marketing difficulties are here briefly introduced to provide some 
framework for the discussion of tenure and credit. In Chapter 4 these 
questions will be dealt with at length. 
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1.2.6 Other Constraints on Small Farmers 
As we have seen in the previous section, the size of the 
household farm is small. A survey has been carried out by the Central 
Statistical Office to determine why the cropped areas of households 
have not been expanded. The results given in Table 1.3 show that the 
main reasons given were the lack of draft animals (41.5 per cent), 
followed by the non-availability of land (33 per cent) and by the lack 
of manpower (16 per cent). The importance of these three reasons 
varies from one province to another. Thus, while the lack of draft 
animals was said to be the main obstacle to land expansion in Keffa, 
Illubabor, Gojjam, Begemdir and Wellega provinces, the non-availability 
of land was the main reason given in Sidamo, Shewa, Harargie, Tigre and 
Wello provinces (mostly communal areas). High population pressure 
exists in these latter areas, which is in contrast to some individual 
tenure areas where lack of manpower is important. 
In both the communal and individual tenure areas, the degree 
of specialization and market dependence is subsistence with supple-
mentary cash production. According to Fisk, subsistence with supple-
mentary cash production is mainly production for consumption, but 
supplementary production is undertaken to secure access to market goods 
and services not available directly from their own resources. This is 
generally the case with individual tenure areas of the south where 
* coffee and chat are grown for the market, whilst cereals are grown for 
consumption. The supplementary production is both for securing access 
to market goods and services not obtainable directly from farmers' own 
resources, and to pay taxes. 
* Chat is a green leaf which is chewed as a stimulant. It is exported 
to Arabic countries and On Ethiopia it is consumed by the Moslem 
community. 
Province Lack of 
market 
Tigre 11.1 
Il1ubabor 31.5 
Sidamo 4.8 
Keffa 2.4 
Shewa 7.2 
Gojjam 
Haragie 4.8 
Begemdir 10.3 
Arussi 
Gemu Goffa 9.7 
Bale 2.4 
Wello 5.6 
We11ega 9 .7 
TABLE 1.3 
NUMBER OF FARMING HOUSEHOLDS BY PRINCIPAL REASON FOR NO FURTHER EXPANSION OF 
CROP AREA, BY PROVINCE (%) 
Lack of Lack of Land ·not Land Land Other 
manpower draft animals available too poor too weedy reason 
8.1 37.3 40.0 6.7 0.9 1.5 
18 .9 56.7 13.4 5.3 1.2 2.7 
19.0 19.1 55.8 2.8 0.5 0.5 
25.1 42.6 19.8 2.0 0.0 7.9 
17.4 31.1 43.9 4.1 1.0 0.8 
7.5 68.7 16.9 3.8 0.5 1.1 
12.1 33.5 44.2 6.2 1.3 1.3 
14.3 59.0 20.9 2.3 1.3 0.8 
24.2 42.1 21.7 6.1 2.0 2.8 
33.4 42.7 15.5 2.6 0.7 3.4 
16.8 44.0 22.0 9.6 1.2 3.8 
11.9 37.8 42.0 6.1 0.2 0.3 
16.5 61.0 12.5 4.1 1 .7 1.9 
Source: Central Statistical Office, National Round Sample Survey, 1963-1968. 
Not 
stated 
5.5 
0.6 
2.1 
1.6 
1.7 
1.4 
2.3 
0.3 
1.1 
0.2 
2.6 
1.6 
2.3 
% of 
total 
100 
100 
100 
100 
100 
100 
100 
100 
100 
100 
100 
100 
100 
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But in the north where communal tenure prevails, the farms are 
overpopulated and the full utilization of land resources is not sufficient 
to meet the essential needs of the persons dependent upon it. Production 
is basically for own consumption. Moreover, the land is not suited to 
growing the more profitable cash crops such as coffee, chat, etc. For 
these reasons, if they do produce a surplus, it is of the common crops 
grown for consumption needs. For this, the local market is limited and 
export is constrained by high transport costs for low value and bulky goods. 
Since taxes have to be paid, a farmer has to sell some of his crops which 
would have gone for his own consumption, or to sell some of his assets 
such as sheep, goats, etc . Thus his subsistence level is reduced and he 
even starves if bad seasons depress production. 
Comparison of these two tenure areas indicates the productivity 
per unit of land is high in the densely populated areas of the northern 
highlands, with accompanying low productivity per unit of labour. An 
addition to the labour force would only result in sharing the work load 
more widely without a concomitant increase in output. This is a situ-
ation of very low marginal productivity of labour. 
In the southern provinces, where individual tenure is the rule, 
the problem is not one of population pressure on land, but of tenancy. 
Part of any increase in total product must be giv n to the landlord. 
There is a low productivity per unit of land but high productivity per 
unit of labour. 
1.3 Type of Credit Concerned 
The brief general overview, plus the analysis of the problems 
faced by small farmers, serves as the backdrop to the final segment of 
the introduction: consideration of the provision of rural credit. 
This study is mainly co cerned with production credit for 
small farmers, taking into account land tenure as one of the major 
variables affecting the supply of credit. Production credit for our 
purpose is defined as credit for the purchase of inputs that will 
increase production. These inputs include fertilizers, pesticides, 
implements, improved seeds, etc. In view of the importance of live-
stock rearing in some areas, credit may also be required in the medium 
term for the purchase of cross-bred heifers (using local cattle and 
Fresian semen). Production credit has to be dealt with in conjunction 
with other services. 
The problem of risk and security, as well as the need to 
provide an adequate proportionate return to the farmer, requires the 
integration of production credit with marketing. Linking production 
credit with agricultural extension also becomes necessary for proper 
usage and application of these new techniques. 
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The aims of providing production credit should be a net increase 
in output at the end of the credit period. The Government can provide 
both the trained extension personnel and the necessary finance. What is 
needed is to get the process started so that there is surplus income for 
capital formation to keep the process going. The initial capital should 
start moving the wheel of the production process until eventually the 
credit requirements can be met without special measures and subsidies. 
In Ethiopia the Government had been reluctant to show such 
leadership but rec ntly foreign-assisted and initiated projects, such as 
the Comprehensive Package Programs and Minimum Package Programs, have 
been instituted. The former are self-contained projects focusing a 
variety of interrelated activities on the farming population wjthin a 
limited geographical area; whereas the latter attempt to disseminate 
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throughout Ethiopia innovations made by the former. The Minimum Package 
Programs have not been very successful in promoting the sale of fertilizer. 
Farmers have been reluctant to use it owing to its high cost. 
Production credit is a package approach which only the Govern-
ment can implement. The farmer has, in the past, been unable to inc ease 
his net output largely because of the lack of credit as suggested here. 
The power of the traditional moneylenders such as mer hants and landlords 
could be reduced once credit institutions are established and start 
functioning. However, for this credit to be effective, other services 
such as marketing and agricultural extension are prerequisites and have 
to be integrated. Some existing institutions and relationships may have 
to be changed and new ones established. 
Land tenure systems are a primary candidate for this necessary 
change. Thus , in Chapter 2, we consider land tenure patterns prior to 
suggesting how altering these will lead to more equitable distribution of 
agricultural credit. 
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CHAPTER 2 
LAND TENURE 
2.1 Background Information 
"Ethiopia's traditional system of land 
ownership was of crucial importance to 
the country's economic and social life, 
for besides determining questions of 
tenure and social class it was the basis 
of administration, taxation and military 
service." (Pankrust, 1966) 
In the past, land tenure varied according to local customs, 
type of agriculture and the total socio-economic structure of the 
communities. Diversity also resulted from the fact that each province, 
for some time, had been autonomous, with its traditional administration 
imposing tenure and taxation as it thought fit for its local con-
ditions. In addition, land tenure had been complicated by the imperial 
grants as well. As one of the Ethiopian legends goes, Menelik I 
(1000 B.C.), after his return from the visit to his father Solomon, 
divided the land in his kingdom into three parts. Keeping a third for 
the Crown, he distributed the remaining one-third each to the church 
and the nobility. Soon after, each of the recipients, including the 
Crown, divided and subdivided their shares for different tributes, 
rents and services among the various classes in the society. 
The Emperors distributed land among those who, in one way or 
another, were in the service of the Crown. The nobility, who were 
responsib e for the administration of territories, raising armies, 
collecting taxes and taking part in military campaigns, were granted 
large estates in various parts of the country . Similarly, the peasantry 
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received small pl ots for their services in carrying and making tents, 
t ransporting military equipment, guarding prisons, raising royal cattle 
and producing fruit and pulses for the royal household. In all con-
ditions, land was used as a salar y f or services and as a means to 
reward supporters and attract followers. 
2.1.1 Types of Land Tenure 
About a quarter of the l and for which data are available 
(Table 2.1) is cultivated under communally derived title , and the 
remainder under individual title. The former cannot be used as 
negotiable instruments and the negotiability of the latter, too, is 
often estricted 
This is not a dis ussion of all the systems of land t nure in 
Ethiopia, and it is neither necessary nor possible to describe them 
all. However, to demonstrate t heir restraining influence over a policy 
of agricultural mode r nisation and credit, some of the more prevalent 
types of land tenure will be discussed. 
It should be n oted at the outset that this discussion of 
tenure patterns is severely limited by the lack of quantitati e data. 
The descriptions of the land tenure situation in Ethiopia are based on 
personal field surveys as well as surveys made by colleagues from the 
Minis ry of Land Reform and reports from the Ministry's policy papers. 
Measurement of individual holdings has never been undertaken in 
Ethiopia on any significant scale. 
ABLE 2.1 
* PROVINCES WITH TYPES OF TENURE AND AREA 
Total Average cult i-
Province Area cultivated vated area per holding area 
( '000 km2 ) (ha) 
COMMUNAL 
TENURE AREAS: 
1. Begemdir 74.2 256,428 
2 . Gojjam 61.6 282,008 
3. Tigre 65.9 317,942 
4. Eritrea 117.6 
INDIVIDUAL 
TENURE AREAS: 
5 . Arussi 23.5 
6 . Gemu Goffa 39 .5 61,693 
7 . Harargie 259.7 299,649 
8 . I11ubabor 47.4 77,206 
9. Keffa 54. 6 201,749 
10. Shewa 85.2 1,124,379 
11. Sidamo 117.3 196,483 
12. We11ega 71.2 223,988 
13. We110 79 .4 392,357 
14. Bale 124.6 
TOTAL 1,221.9 3,433,882 
Source: Central Statistical Office , Na iona1 
Sample Reports, 1963-1968. 
* 
(ha) 
1.35 
1.15 
1. 26 
0.54 
1.14 
0.69 
0.90 
1.68 
0.52 
1 . 17 
0.97 
1.03 
No data are available for provinces of Eritrea, 
Arussi and Bale regarding t otal cultivate d area 
and per holding. 
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2.1.2 Communal Ownership of Land 
This is characteristic of Ethiopia's four northern provinces , 
Eritrea, Tigre, Begemdir and Gojjam, as well as two districts in Wello 
province, and parts of northern Shewa (where the tenure situation is in 
a state of flux). Communal tenure features two alternative sub-systems, 
according to which individuals and families hold rights to cultivate 
land by virtue of: (a) membership in the extended family descended 
from a man who is regarded as having been the original settler in the 
area , or (b) residence in a particular village whose common property 
the land is considered to be. Village ownership of land was more common 
in Eritrea and Tigre than in other provinces. In either case, persons 
who are accorded rights under both systems cannot alienate their rights 
or any part of the communally-held land through sale, gift, or mortgage, 
nor can they affect the rights of their descendants by means of bequest. 
Since any individual belongs to several extended families 
. 
whose founding fathers settled in different areas, in theory, every 
participant in the extended family system can claim right to cultivate 
in various locations. In areas where land rights descend through both 
the male and female lines, the number of possibilities is theoretically 
double that in systems of descent through the male line only. 
In practice, the majority of people are able to assert rights 
only to land cultivated by one or both parents, or to the land controlled 
by the extended family within whose domain the individual was raised. 
Those in a position to make good their claims to plots within the 
domains of different families tend to be persons of relatively high 
social status. To point out the extent to which an individual can 
claim rights, Hoben (1965) describes the activitie s of an individual 
"who has been able to activate claims through no less than eleven 
descent lines", allowing him use of a large number of land parcels. 
The individual member of a land-owning family is entitled to 
ret in his share even after a long period 0 absence or failure to 
cultivate that share. Ownership of such land is not only of economic 
significance but of social importance, for social status achieved 
through inheritance of land is permanent and inalienable. 
25 
Under the village system, some communities accord rights only 
to those residents who can trace their descent to the founding father, 
while in other villages, permanent residence and payment of land tax is 
a sufficient condition . In the latter system, where the share of the 
village land was not determined by descent but by residence, an 
individual was entitled to an equal share of the fertile, semi-fertile 
and poor land. And change of holding by periodic distribution took 
place by casting lots, usually every five years. Whenever an individual 
left the village his plots reverted to the community. If he returned 
he stayed without any holding until the village elders started a 
redistribution of all holdings in the village community. 
In both the extended family and village ownership systems, 
persons can rent to others land over which they have rights. In the 
case 0 permanent absentees, the holding is either cultivated by a tenant 
or by the nearest relative in the extended family system entitling him 
to collect a share of the produce. But in th e village ownership system, 
holdings fall under periodic distribution by the community. 
According to the Central Statistical Office National Sample 
Survey, the following proportions of peasant holdings in three communal 
tenure provinces are partly or fully rented: 
TABLE 2.2 
TENANCE IN THE COMMUNAL TENURE PROVINCES 
* 
Pure Partly owned 
Province tenant and 
holdings partly rented 
Tigre 7% 18% 
Begemdir 9% 6% 
Gojjam 13% 7% 
Source: Central Statistical Office, 
National Sample Surveys, 1963-68. 
* Erit rea is excluded because the political 
situation in this province has made sur-
veys impossible. 
In principle, every person owns land but because of the 
inheritance system (which perpetuates fragmentation) everyone who 
farms has several or few small fields dotted about in different 
parts of the area, s ometime s as much as 15-20 km from his home. This 
fragmentation of farn~rst lands into small, widely separated parcels 
inhibits efficiency and leads to wastage of time. 
The existence of tenancy in the areas noted in Table 2.2 is 
mainly due to the distance between farm and residence caused by the 
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system of inheritance which may lead to a farmer gaining non-continuous 
parcels of land through inheritance from relatives on both the paternal 
and maternal sides. Consequently, the owner prefers to cultivate the 
farm nearest to his home while renting out the furthest ones. 
The most acute problem in these northern areas is the popu-
1ation pressure. As more and more people have to be accommoda ted in a 
limited area, the size of individual holdings fall, and pressure on the 
land as a whole, steadily increases. Already there are clear signs that 
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population has built up beyond the point at which the land can support 
all of the people in the area. Increasing numbers of people are finding 
themselves without land, whilst others are finding that the amount of 
land to which they can gain access is insufficient to produce the quan-
tity of basic food that they require. 
This development creates various consequences. In some places 
it merely leads to a lowering of income, and nutritional levels, as 
people sink further into poverty. In other cases, however, the response 
to this developing situation is migration of the people from their 
traditional home areas to where they can find land to cultivate. Some-
times, this means cultivation on mountain slopes, thereby aggravating 
erosion. In other instances , however, migration from overcrowded areas 
has been extreme with people moving very long distances to the south 
where there are government lands. Such migration has led to the occu-
pation of the unused government land on an unorganised basis, through 
a process which has come to be known as "spontaneous settlement". 
Some economic implications of communal tenure -
Farmers on the lands subj ect to communal tenure are at a dis-
advantage in the development of the farms for several reasons, including: 
(a) Because of dispersion of farm plots, agricultural 
operations require an unnecessarily large amount 
of labour and capital resources. Where farmers do 
not have sufficient manpower and other resources 
to farm adequately their dispersed parcels , the 
parcels lying at far distance are undersLandably 
neglected. 
(b) Lack of incentive to i~rove the land owing to 
vulnerability of title to other claimants. 
(c) There is no individual or group title as the 
land is not measured and registered. This has 
restricted access to agricultural credit because 
of the inability of cultivators to offer the 
land cultivated as security for a loan. 
"This affected the small farmers between 
1951 and 1960 when the Development Bank 
of Ethiopia required the provision of 
security interests in their land." 
(Lawrence and Mann, 1960) 
This credit system was designed in such a 
fashion that it discouraged small farmers from 
borrowing since no title existed. Other 
sources of credit will be discussed in Chapter 3. 
Rights on communal land are not usable as guarantees for 
personal credit because, in the case of family ownership, the land 
cannot be transferred by sale, gift or mortgage. Under village owner-
ship farmers' rights on land are subject to redistribution every five 
to seven years. Also, if a farmer leaves the village he loses his 
right, at least temporarily. Where this system operates, banks are 
reluctant to accept such land as security for credit purposes. 
2.2 Individual Ownership of Land 
The bulk of individually-owned land can nowadays be sold or 
mortgaged so that the title is a negotiable instrument. Such freehold 
tenures have evolved gradually. During the last quarter of the 19th 
century, the authority of the Central Government was extended to the 
southern provinces. In these provinces, Emperor Menlelik introduced 
individual ownership in the sense of heritable rights to land, at that 
time inalienable, known as "rist". But in the early stages of this 
extension freehold was the dominant form of tenure in the provinces of 
Shewa, Arussi, Sidamo Keffa, Wellega, Illubabor, Bale and Harargie . 
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The land was apportioned among the balabats (local nobility) , 
the clergy and the soldiers. It was ruled that the balabats would take 
one-third of the land in their own locality as freehold, known in these 
cases as siso (one-third). Some balabats who opposed the authority of 
the Central Government forfeited their rights. In the course of time, 
many administrators and soldiers also acquired land as "rist" in these 
provinces. The clergy received allocations in the form of semon land. 
Fo rmerly, owners of semon land possessed inalienable heritable rights 
to the land conditional upon rendering ecclesiastical services or paying 
the church to hire substitutes for them. Of the land which it reserved 
for itself, the Government allocated a part under maderia tenure (land 
given by the Government for services rendered). Holders of maderia 
land can bequeath it to their descendants, as long as the latter continue 
to render administrative and military services to the State, but they 
cannot sell or mortgage the land. 
The allocation of these lands was made possible by the system-
atic introduction of land measurement. A unit of measurement known as 
the asha was used which varied from 35 hectares in fertile areas to 
80 hectares in poor areas. Variations in size were allowed to compen-
sate for differences in quality of land. The introduction of land 
measurement enabled the Government to levy land tax on individual owners 
in lieu of the traditional head tax. The State used its growing tax 
revenue to establish and gradually extend throughout the country a paid 
civil service, national army and police force, in addition to which a 
system of pensions following disability or retirement was introduced 
only very recently. After the 1936-42 war, in lieu of pensions, the 
Government allowed maderia holders to convert a po rtion of their holdings 
into rist. It also enacted a system of granting one gasha each of 
government land as rist to patriots and exiles, and to all civil servants, 
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army personnel and police. As a result, the proportion of land owned by 
individuals as rist has increased substantially over the years. 
Today rist, known officially as gebbar, is the most widely 
prevalent individual tenure. The owners of such land are required to pay 
land tax, agricultural income tax, education tax and health tax directly 
to the Government. They can sell, lease or mortgage their lands and 
their rights are heritable . The second most prevalent individual tenure 
is semon, which differs from rist or gebbar mainly in that tax revenues 
from the land was ceded - originally 100 per cent, now only partially -
by the State to the church. At present, the owners of such land pay the 
church the equivalent of the national education tax and in lieu of land 
tax a negotiated amount for upkeep of a nearby church and its priests. 
To the State they pay health and agricultural income taxes. Semon land 
can be sold, leased, mortgaged on bequeathed . 
Data from the general land tenure surveys carried out by the 
Ministry of Land Reform during 1966-68 show the following distribution 
of "measured" land among individual tenures in the southern provinces 
(MLRA, 1971): 
Gebbar (rist) 
Semon 
Siso 
Made ria 
TOTAL 
73% 
13% 
10% 
4% 
100% 
early all "unmeasured" land, other than that owned by the Government 
falls into the category of gebbar or rist. 
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The last type of tenurial system to be considered is gebretel 
land. This is land taken over by the Government because of non-payment 
of land tax by the landowner. The Government can then lease this land 
out to individuals for grazing and farming purposes. The defaulter has 
the right to regain the land by paying double the amount of tax due, 
unless it has already been leased out. "This system led to various 
complications as sometimes tax officials failed to give receipts for 
payment of tax and the farmers, being ignorant of procedure, failed to 
demand such a receipt." (Schwab, 1972). As a result, litigation is 
initiated which may take years and is complicated by the fact that when 
a decision is reached, those who have received this land may refuse to 
leave and will initiate their own court case. The court has ruled now 
that without the receipt the landowner is handicapped. 
With land held on individual title, there arise three major 
problems: tenancy, distribution of ownership and the absenteeism of 
large landlords. 
2.2.1 Tenancy in the Individual Tenure Provinces 
At the outset it may be pointed out that in the provincial 
land tenure surveys the data on tenancy conditions is only fragmentary. 
On other aspects such as mode and quantum of rent payment and type of 
contract, th individual provincial reports have to depend on the sample 
surveys conducted by the Central Statistical Office in various provinces. 
In addition to these sources, the Department of Land Tenure has under-
taken detailed investigation into landlord-tenant relationships in 
three regions of the country - Chore and Ada in Shewa province and Tabor 
in Simamo province. Nevertheless the available information on this vital 
aspect of agrarian structure is sketchy and therefore in the future it 
will be of vital importance to conduct some detailed studies of tenancy 
conditions, at least on some selected sample areas to fill in the gaps 
existing in the available data. 
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Land tax was originally paid as a "tithe", and in many provinces 
this "tithe" is still collected from tenants by landlords, either as part 
of, or more frequently in addition to the rent. In some cases the new 
land tax is collected in addition to the "tithe". 
There is some evidence concerning the mode of payment of rent, 
indicating that in some provinces, notably Shewa, Arussi and Wello, pay-
ment is made mainly in crop, whilst in other provinces other forms of 
paym nt, including money, are more favoured. There is also little evidence 
on the propostion of product paid in rent in four provinces, which sugge sts 
that in Wello 63 per cent of share cropping leases gave over 50 per cent 
to the landlord, whilst in Arussi the proportion of such leases is 43 pe r 
n and in W 11 -ga 28 p r c nt. 
Evidence is also given that suggests the vast majority of 
tenancy agreements are unwritten. Details are recorded in Appendix C. 
Adverse economic effects are assumed to result from such a high 
rate of tenancy, much of it on a share cropping basis. For example, 
tenants lacking the pride and security of ownership are thought to be 
unwilling to invest effort and funds beyond the minimum necessary to 
subsist. This reluctance to invest is thought to be compounded where, in 
a share cropping tenancy, a portion of the gain from extra investment 
msut be turned over to a landlord who bears none of the extra c os t. 
To illustrate further, in 1971 , one quint a l (100 kilogr amme s) 
of diamonium phosphate (DAP) fertilizer, at a typical r ural delive r y 
point, cost $E42.* The 4.3 additional qui ntals of tef f ll (indi gen ous grai n) 
* 
/I 
$E1 = $USO. 48 . 
Teff (Eragroti s Abysinca ) which is an indigenous f i ne gras s grain , 
is the main cereal and forms about a third of the ce real produc ti on. 
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obtained by applying this fertiliser to one h ctare were worth about 
$E84 at prices estimated by the Minist ry of Agriculture. For the effort 
and risk involved in purchasing and applying fertiliser, the owner-
cultivator with no rent to pay could thus obtain a net return of $84 - $42 
equals $42, or 100 per cent over material cost. 
In addition, the tenant cannot get credit from a credit 
institution because he has no guarantee to present in terms of land or 
collateral. Even to get a modest amount of credit for fertiliser, he 
has to present the sponsorship of two guarantors of which one is his 
own landlord, so that he is dependent on the landlord not only for the 
land but also for credit. In such a situation, although the tenant may 
not be evicted as long as the landlord is his guarantor, owing to the 
absence of a tenancy bill, it is the landlord who stands to benefit more 
from the investment made by the tenant (as seen from the above example). 
2.2.2 Size Distribution of Holdings in the Individual Tenure Provinces 
This is another important aspect of individual land tenure which 
creates additional problems for credit and for agricultural development. 
According to the Central Statistical Office survey referred to above, 
two-thirds of all holdings in Ethiopia have no more than 1 ha under crops 
and 42 per cent of all holdings have half a hectare or less under crops. 
(See Table 2.1). 
At the opposite end of the scale, there are a few thousand 
individuals who own more than one hundred hectares, and a few dozen whose 
~ 
holdings are measured in tens of gashas. In the first half of 1972 the 
Minis ry of Land Reform and Administration compiled data on large land 
* The gasha is now standardised at 40 hectares, but its legal size as 
applied to holdings listed in tax registers, varies among different 
parts of Ethiopia. 
TABLE 2.3 
DISTRIBUTION OF PRIVATE HOLDINGS LISTED IN WEREDA (DISTRICT CAPITAL) 
TAX REGISTERS AS MEASURING 3 GASHAS* OR MORE FOR SEVEN PROVINCES OF 
INDIVIDUAL TENURE 
Size - class 
of holdings 
(in gashas) 
From To 
3.1 5 
5.1 10 
10.1 15 
15.1 20 
20.1 25 
25 .1 30 
30.1 35 
35.1 40 
40.1 50 
50.1 75 
75.1 100 
over 100 
TOTAL 
Number of Total Percentage of 
holdings gas has gashas in holdings of 3 gashas or more 
3708 13601 36.0 
1280 9369 24.7 
272 3410 9.0 
126 2195 5.8 
54 1198 3.2 
39 1137 3.0 
17 564 1.5 
12 458 1.2 
23 1048 2.8 
16 945 2.5 
6 523 1.4 
10 3359 8.9 
5563 37807 100.0 
Source: Ministry of Land Reform , Policy Paper, 1972. 
* Gasha = 40 hec t ares. 
w 
~ 
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holdings from the Wereda (district capital) tax registers of seven of the 
ten provinces in the individual tenure areas. These data are summarised 
in Table 2.3 which shows the number of holdings by size of three ga has 
or more, together with the total number of gashas registered in each class. 
For two reasons, these data understate the degree of concen-
tration of large holdings in the hands of a few individuals. Firstly, 
most of the land listed in Wereda tax registers in Ethiopia has never been 
accurately measured, and it is widely believed that the true size of the 
larger holdings is generally understated in the registers. Secondly, in 
compiling the data it was not possible to consolidate holdings which belong 
to the same individual, but are listed separately in one or more Wereda 
registers. Since many people own large holdings in more than one Wereda 
or province, and some have different holdings in the same Wereda, total 
holdings of landowners are more concentrated in the larger size classes 
than the table reveals. 
clusions: 
The results of these two surveys lead to the following con-
(a) The majority of the rural population owns very small 
holdings of only approximately 1 hectare (Table 2.1) 
and this is in most cases fragmented into several 
locations. 
(b) Ownership of the remainder of the non-government land 
is concentrated in the hands of a few thousand people. 
1nus large landlords own more than 1.5 million hectares 
of land. 
(c) Small farmers operating less than a half hectare 
under cultivation (46 per cent of holdings) or less 
than 1 hectare (two-thirds of total holdings) and even 
a part of those cultivating less than 2 hectares of 
2.2.3 
subsistence crops can represent only a moderate 
demand for credit and have only a limited value 
as customers in contrast to large landowners as 
far as the banks are concerned, because of the 
high cost of credit distribution and of repayment 
collection by the bank. 
Absentee Ownership 
Vast tracts of land are owned by important people who live 
in the capital city. These lands were given out in patronage grants in 
different provinces and as a resul t , some of the landowners (grantees ) 
may not even know where these grants are, much less visit or develop 
them. 
Table 2.4 gives the proportion of absentee landowners to 
total landowners in different individual tenure provinces. In a pilot 
study conducted by the Ministry of Land Reform, underutilisation of 
land was the most common practice of absentee l andlords. However, 
there are some reasons for this absenteeism. In certain cases, it is 
argued that it is the remoteness of the area or the poor transportation 
and communication facilities which are responsible for the lack of any 
profitable utilisation of the land. In some cases, the financial 
position and the technical competence of the owner are incompatible 
with the size of his holding . But in the majority of cases there is a 
lack of adequate interest in farming on the part of t he landowners. 
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Such people have acquired large landholdings by inheritance or by virtue 
of land grants and often hoard land for spe culative purposes or for 
reasons of social pres ige and social status. 
TABLE 2.4 
PROPORTION OF ABSENTEE LANDOWNERS TO TOTAL NUMBER OF 
LANDOv.TNERS AND OF THE AREA OWNED BY THEM 
Absentee owners Percentage of area with 
Province as percentage of absentee owners to 
total owners total owned area 
Shewa 35 45 
Arussi 28 27 
We110 26 13 
Wellega 29 28 
Harargie 23 48 
Illubabor 42 42 
Keffa 18 34 
Gemu Goffa 10 42 
Sidamo 25 42 
Bale 15 12 
Source: Land Tenure Compilation Survey, 1971. 
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Regarding the area leased out to tenants, the information was 
collected by the Central Statistical Office through a sample survey of 
the country. 
First we shall take up the distribution of cultivated area 
according to tenures. The Central Statistical Office has a three-way 
classification of tenures: owner cultivated, purely rented and partly 
mmed and partly rented. According to this classification "owner culti-
vators" are those who cultivate entirely owned land; "purely rented" are 
those households who operate lands entirely leased from others and 
"partly owned and partly rented" are the holdings of those households who 
in addition to the lands owned by them, cultivate land leased from others 
(National Sample Surveys, 1963-68). The following table gives the 
distribution of total cultivated area of individual tenures. 
TABLE 2.5 
DISTRIBUTION OF CULTIVATED AREA 
(in hectares) 
Owner operated Rented Partly owned 
and partly rented Province 
Area % Area % Area % 
Shewa 314,826 28 618,409 55 191,144 17 
Arussi 84,789 38 114,178 51 25,542 11 
We110 239 , 654 61 56,438 14 96,267 25 
We11ega 102,905 46 110,291 49 10,792 5 
Harargie 117,312 39 136,690 46 45,647 15 
I11ubabor 26,055 34 47,718 62 3,433 4 
Keffa 58,278 29 135,246 67 8,225 4 
Gemu Goffa 29,246 48 28,592 46 3,855 6 
Sidamo 125,728 64 68,453 35 2,302 1 
TOTAL 1,098,793 39 1,316,015 47 387 , 207 14 
Source: Compilation of the General Land Tenure Survey, 1971. 
Total 
1,124,379 
224,509 
392,359 
223,988 
299,649 
77,206 
201,749 
61,693 
196,483 
2,802,015 
w 
co 
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It can be seen from the above table that th e area operated by 
tenants is larger than that cultivated by the owners throughout the nine 
individual tenure provinces. A little less than half of the lands are 
operated by "pure tenan s" and the cultivation of about 60 per cent of 
the land is shared between pure tenants and those who have partly-owned 
land and partly-rented land. All these provinces, except Arussi and 
Wellega, report a high incidence of absentee ownership. However, in 
all these provinces the extent of cultivated land leasing is higher than 
the proportion of cultivated land owned and operated by landlords. 
2.3 Government Ownership of Land 
The information which the Government has concerning its own 
landholding is deficient. Firstly, most holdings have never been properly 
demarcated and measured and secondly, in the first Ethiopian Constitution 
of 1931 , the Emperor became part of the Government rather than being the 
Government. No attempt was made to separate his revenues and property 
from that of the State. "Since the Emperor's accounts were not made 
public and there was no separation of State and Imperial land, no 
knowledge existed upon which to determine how much land was actually owned 
by the State and the Emperor" ( S c hw ab, 19 7 2) . All that is certain is 
that the holdings are quite large and remain entirely tax exempt. These 
lands are underutilised. 
Data collected from provincial land offices over a number of 
years by the Ministry of Land Reform, supplemented by analysis of maps 
and revised through March 1972, suggest that the Government owns approxi-
mately 11.7 million hectares of land that is arable or potentially arable 
under irrigation (MLRA, 1972). This land is distributed as follows among 
the four regions of the country: 
TABLE 2.6 
AREAS OF GOVERNMENT LAND, ARABLE OR POTENTIALLY ARABLE 
(millions of hectares) 
Region 
Arable Arable Total 
without only with Arable irrigation irrigation 
Central 3.7 3.6 
Northern 1.2 0.7 1.9 
Western 5.5 5.5 
South-eastern 0.8 0.8 
TOTAL 10.4 1.5 11.8 
Source: Statistical Abstract, 1971. 
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Part of this land has been distributed or is at present under 
cultivation in different forms as follows: 
TABLE 2.7 
DISTRIBUTION OF GOVERNMENT LAND FROM TABLE 2.6 
Form [million 1 hectares 
Irrigable land that will not be developed 
before the next century 
Land already committed under grant orders 
Land already allocated for large scale farming 
Land already occupied by pastoralists, recog-
nised tenants of the Government and spontaneous 
1.25 
0.4 
0.4 
settlers 1.0 
Land allocated to national parks and wild life 
reserves 
TOTAL 
Source: Ministry of Land Reform, 1971. 
3.4 
Residual total arable or potentially arable government land 
available for settlement is thus probably about 8.5 million hectares. 
TABLE 2.8 
* GOVERNMENT LANDS 
(in units of 8 km2 or more) 
A 
Categories of Land 
B C 
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Agricultural 
Potential Unoccupied 
rain-fed 
arable land 
Mainly arab Ie 
land occupied 
by Nomads 
(in km2 ) 
Range land 
ocupied 
by Nomads 
Total 
Crops 13,547 84,470 
Grazing only 3,744 391,344 
Unknown potential n.n. n.n. n.n. 
No potential 931 
TOTAL 
Source: A Policy-oriented Study of Land Settlement 
(Burke-Thornley Report, Ministry of Land 
Reform and Administration, December, 1969) 
Vo1s. 1-11. 
* Th.is is ot'.ly aT' esti1rllte of government lands in sizes 
exceeding 8 km2 • No information is available for 
smaller size lands. 
98,017 
395,088 
15,000 
931 
509,036 
According to a survey by ~he Ministry of Land Reform (1969) 
government land in units of 8 km2 arbitrarily chosen ( 1 km2 = 100 ha) 
or over in extent, the Government owned over 509,000 km2 of land of 
which about 20 per cent clearly had an arable potential (table 2 .8) . 
The potential arable area would actually be much more as this survey 
did not consider pieces of government land in areas of less than 8 km2 • 
The lat ter are estimated at 48 , 000 km2 • 
However, Category B of Table 2.8 lands are largely located 
along the Western borders which are extremely remote and have poor 
communications (and a high incidence of cattle disease); Category C 
land has only grazing potential (and is also essential for the liveli-
hood of about 2 million Nomads) . Therefore , it is, strictly 
speaking, only lands under Categor y A which are suitable for agricul-
tural settlements . 
If land grants are used to provide land for the landless, 
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they can relieve the population pressur e of the northern communal tenure 
region and provide an alternative t o the tenancy system of the south. 
And if th s 1 nds ar :. used for settlement they afford an opportunity 
for close governmental control of cul t ivation through the availability 
of credit and other services i n the interests of development. 
A survey car,ried ou t by the Ministry of Land Reform found 
that only 35 per cent of the area involved in a sample of patronage 
grants in five provinces (excluding grants to landless and unemployed 
citizens) was in agricultural use, and that in only one-third of the 
cases where cultivation was being carried out was the owner so engaged 
on his own account, rather than through tenants or contractors (Policy 
Paper, 1971). The large majority of those receiving patronage grants 
follow one of three courses of action: (1) they establish tenants or 
contractors on the land, or lease it to graziers; (2) finding squa t ters 
already cultivating the land, they assert their rights as landlords a nd 
demand rent from the squatters; or (3) they sell the land, realising 
the cash value of th grant . It is not surprising that persons who 
have spent most or all of their government careers outside farming a re 
reluctant to turn after retirement to the drudgery of a peasant's life. 
TABLE 2.9 
PERCENTAGE DISTRIBUTION OF MEASURED AND UNMEASURED 
LAND OWNED BY THE CHURCH IN PROVINCES OF INDIVIDUAL TENURE 
Percentage of Percentage of 
Province measured unmeasured land land 
(owned) (owned) 
Wellega 4.96 
Arussi 23.5 
Shewa 13.6 1.0 
Gemu Goffa 5.38 4.31 
Wello 13.60 11.47 
Sidamo 3.30 1 . 0 
Source: Report on Land Tenure Survey, Ministry 
of Land Reform (Addis Ababa, 1968 and 1968). 
2.4 Church lands 
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The Ethiopian Orthodox Church is the Established Church of the 
Empire. Historically, Ethiopian Emperors have granted lands to the 
church and exempted it from the payment of certain taxes. It is esti-
mated that the church owns 30 per cent of the land in the country. 
No reliable data are available on the amount of land under 
church domain; this is largely because, like the rest of the country, 
very large parts of church land are unmeasured. According to the records 
of the Ethiopian Orthodox Church, it held only 30,184 gashas (or approxi-
mately 1.2 milli n hectares) in measured land and the remainder in large 
pieces of unmeasured land (Aba Gebre Ezzibaher, 1965). The unmeasured 
lands owned by the church were partially estimated at 30,425 gashas (or 
approximately 1.3 million hectares) by Lawrence and Mann (1964) in the 
individual tenure provinces. 
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The figures shown in Table 2.9, which deal with the amount of 
land actually owned by the church in individual tenure provinces only 
were included in a series of Land Tenure Reports prepared by the Minis try 
of Land Reform. 
By decree No.2 of 1942 and the additional exemption granted in 
the Land Tax Proclamation of 1944, the church pays no land tax to the 
Government. Though yearly figures as to what the church receives in 
tax revenue are almost impossible to obtain, it is known that in 1969/70 
the total land tax/revenue paid to the church was $El,98l,148. This was 
11.5 per cent of the total land tax revenue from the whole country. 
The church is an economic power as well as a political and 
cultural one. The provision of services by a tenant to his landlord has 
been rendered illegal by Proclamation 230 of 1966. But the provision of 
services like free labour on the farm, free l abour for herding cattle 
and free domestic services, still prevails , the more so on church lands. 
"The Church is the most conservative, backward-looking, most resistant to 
change and is one of those reactionary powers which the forces of 
modernization must contend with" (Schwab, 1972). Occasionally, the State 
carried out physical collection of taxes and turned the revenue over to 
the church, but generally the church collects its own taxes. It thus has 
an autonomy approaching sovereignty with regard to these lands and any 
land reform would meet with opposition. In view of the influence of the 
church over the highland peasantry (communal provinces), such oppos ition 
might well be shared by the very peasants whom the reform might b 
designed to aid . 
Development needs the mobilisat ion of resources for purposes of 
investment and the direction of investment into proper channels so as LO 
achieve a rapid growth of national economy. This means investment in 
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productive purposes. In Ethiopia, the amount of church tax revenues 
remains unchecked and unchallenged. It is said that this money goes for 
the upkeep of churches and salaries of pries ts h o are in the capital 
city. 
This outline of the land tenure systems of Ethiopia is 
neces sarily incomplete, but for the purposes of this study, it is 
sufficient to show the main institutional features affecting t he land 
ownership and usage of the great majority of the population. These 
institutions basically divide into two main sets, viz: 
(a) The communal tenure systems of the northern 
provinces Begemdir, Tigre, Gojjam, Eritrea 
and two districts of Wello and Shewa 
provinces. 
(b) The individual ownership cum tenure systems 
of Arussi, Bale, Wello, Shewa, Wellega, Harargie, 
Illubabor, Keffa, Gemu Goffa and Sidamo. 
TIGt{E 
WELLO 
HARARGIE 
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FIGURE 3. I 
MAP OF ETHIOPIA; 
AGRICULTURAL PACKAGE PROJECTS 
Comprehensive 
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C TER 3 
TRADITIONAL AND INSTITUTIONAL SOURCES OF CREDIT 
This chapter seeks to achieve three objects: Firstly, 
to describe the demand for credit; why people want it, where they ge t 
it from (and at what rates of interest) and who gets what proportion 
of total credit extended. The second section examines credit supply 
by institutional means. Finally, this chapter examines the agricul-
tural package projects and their role in rural development. 
3.1 The Potential Demand for Credit 
3.1.1 Traditional Sour ces 
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The small farmers in Ethiopia obtain loans from different 
traditional sources and for various purposes. Thus, according to the 
Central Statistical Office, Second Round National Sample Surveys in 
1970, about 1.9 million loans were received by small f a rmers in t hir teen 
provinces of the country (excluding Eritrea), representing the s um of 
57 million dollars (with an average of $E30 per l oan) , (see Table 3. 1) . 
3.1.2 Indebtedness According to Purpose 
Appendix D shows the detailed analysis of the use of loans i n 
different province s. Thus it appears that at the national level about 
ha l f of the loans (46 per cent) are used f or the purchase of food, while 
the other half is spent on items such as payment of taxes (10.5 per cent), 
agricultural purposes (10 per cent), purchase of clothing (8.5 per cent), 
ceremonies (5 per cent), and medica expense s and trading (2.5 pe r cent) 
each. 
TABLE 3.1 
DISTRIBUTION OF TRADITIONAL LOANS IN ETHIOPIA, 1963-68 
Number of Percentage of Average Subject Size loans number $E 
1. Purchase of food 874,962 45.6 19.4 
2. Purchase of clothing 161,563 8.4 18.2 
3. Payment of medical expenses 50,273 2.6 34.7 
4. Purchase of house or building 
material 20,075 1.0 90.3 
5. Expense on ceremonies 89,547 4.7 51.1 
6 . Payment of tax 202,630 10.5 22.0 
7 . Purchase of land 15,222 0 . 8 16.2 
8. Purchase of livestock 78,701 4.1 49.4 
9. Purchase of seeds, tools, 
household equipment 96,297 5.0 14.7 
10. For trading 54,255 2.8 111.0 
11. Other reasons 250,157 13.0 52.5 
12. Not stated 8,815 0.5 31.9 
TOTAL 1,901,097 100.0 30.0 
Source: Central Statistical Office, 1963-68, A.A . 
Total 
sum 
$E ('000) 
16,974.2 
2,940.4 
1,744.4 
1,812.772 
4,575.8 
4,457.8 
245.5 
3,887.8 
1,415.6 
6, 022.3 
13,133.2 
281.1 
57,074.9 
Percentage 
of total 
29.7 
5.7 
3.0 
3.7 
8.0 
7.8 
0.4 
6.8 
2.5 
10.6 
23.0 
0.5 
100.0 
..j::--
co 
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Loans for agricultural purposes account for a low percentage 
of the farmers' indebtedness. Of these , nearly 70 per cent by value is 
used to purchase livestock and only 25 per cent for the purchase of seeds, 
tools and household equipment. 
The amount used for the purchase of food is higher in the 
communal tenure provinces; 70 per cent by value in Wello and 64 per cent 
in Tigre provinces due to the density of population. On the other hand, 
the purchase of land is important in those individual tenure provinces 
where land can be purchased. As we have seen in Chapter 2, land cannot be 
purchased in the communal tenure system. 
The distribution of loans among the thirteen provinces shows 
(see Appendix D) that around 25 per cent are distributed in Shewa because 
the capital city is in that province and most of the agricultural projects 
are concentrated there. Hence, more credit is provided in this province 
than in others. The distribution is 10 per cent in Begemdir, 8.5 per 
cent in Keffa, and about 8 per cent in each of Tigre and Wellega, while 
the remaining 50 per cent is distributed among the nine other provinces. 
3.1.3 Indebtedness according to the Source of Loan 
The small farmers in Ethiopia obtain their loans from a multi-
tude of sources, the ll~in ones being traders, their own landlords, othe r 
land owners, the church, relatives , etc. (see Table 3 . 2). In Table 3 . 1 
it was observed that the average size of loan was $E30 and hence in 
analysing Table 3.2 the following should be borne in mind: (a) a very 
small portion of the total outlay on farm operations and home consumption 
is in the form of cash; (b) the percentage of families which borrow i s 
small and the average amount borrower per family is also small, and 
(c) the percentage of borrowing in cash to total borrowings is also smal l. 
TABLE 3.2 
SOURCE OF LO&~ IN ETHIOPIA FOR SMALL FARMERS, 1963-681 
Landlord Trader Owner Church Banks Others Not stated 2 
°Eerated Total 
Value Province Value Value Value Value Value Value Value $E $E % $E % $E % $E % $E % $E % $E % ('000) ( , 000) ('000) ( '000) ('000) ('000) ('000) ('000) 
Gemu Goffa 13.2 0.8 310.7 23.3 514.4 38.9 288.2 21.8 194.3 14.7 1322.4 
Sidamo 137.8 2.2 1722.9 27.5 1547.4 24.7 2831.8 45.2 18.7 0.3 6265.1 
I11ubabor 151.7 4.5 566.3 16.5 1267.7 37.6 3.3 0.1 1389.1 41.2 3.3 0.1 3371.8 
Gojjam 45.4 1 . 9 205.5 8.6 714.6 29.9 619.0 25.9 781.5 32.7 16.7 0.7 2390.0 
Shewa 672.3 4.4 3608.2 18.2 5114.9 25.8 10011.8 50.5 178.4 0.9 19825.4 
Harargie 235.2 5.0 522.3 11 . 1 1788.2 38.0 2070.6 44.0 51.7 1.1 4705.9 
We11ega 121.3 3.9 466.5 15.0 1160.1 37.3 1337.4 43.0 21.7 1.7 3110 .. 3 
We110 82.0 3.7 505.8 22.8 980.5 44.2 128.6 5.8 13.3 0.6 450.3 20.3 48.8 2.2 2218.4 
Keffa 141.2 3.0 1082.5 23.0 1750.8 37.2 47.0 0.1 1694.4 36.0 28 .2 0.6 4706.7 
Bale 148.4 7.1 311.4 14.9 921.9 44.1 6.2 0.3 679.4 32.5 22.9 1.1 2090.5 
Tigre 56.6 1.8 327.1 10.4 1855.8 59.0 50.3 1.6 846.1 26.9 9.4 0.3 3145.4 
Begemdir 12.9 0.3 147.2 3.4 2035.8 47.0 459 .1 10.6 1624.3 37.5 25.9 0.6 4331.5 
Arussi 162.6 9 . 4 93 .4 5.4 662.5 38.3 790 . 6 45.7 20.7 1.2 1730.0 
TOTAL 1981.0 3.3 9860.3 16.7 20315.3 34.4 1257.1 2.1 70.0 0.1 24796.0 42.0 641.4 1.0 59213.8 
Source: Central Statistical Office, Second Round National Sample Surveys, 1963-68, A.A. 
1. Excludes Eritrea. 
2 . The values for each column are arrived at by mUltiplying the number of loans by their 
V1 
respective average values. 0 
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Correspondingly, a very small proport i on of the total f arm output is 
sold for cash and this percentage of cash receipts to total income (cash 
and kind) is also small . 
The Central Statistical Office inquiry has s hown that at the 
national level, 42 per cent of the total value of loans are given by 
"others" (mainly relatives and friends), 34.4 per cent by owner-operators, 
and 16.7 per cent by traders. Commercial bank loans are insigni f icant 
because very few co-operatives are established and registered and the 
banks do not have branches in most of the rural are as. 
However, owner operators provide the largest category in Tigre 
province (about 60 per cent), Begemdir province (47 pe r cent), and Wello 
province (44 per cent). These are communal provinces and the main 
reason that owner-operators provide the highest numb er o f loans here i s 
that the owner-operators and tenants live i n the same village and know 
each other's problems, credit needs and repayment risks. This does not 
hold in the individual tenure provinces where the landlord is often an 
abs ntee. But in thos e provinces where coffee is widely grO\Vll, traders 
play an important part charging high interest rates as we shall see in 
Table 3.3 . 
3.1.4 Indebtedness according to the Rate of Interest 
Table 3.3 shows the level of indebtedness according to t he 
rate of interest in the sample survey. Thus we find that about 22 per 
cent of the total value of loans is obtained at very high rates of 
interest (100-200 per cent per annum). But if we conside r t he r ates of 
interest accord i ng to the source of loan, we f ind t hat t h e highes t rates 
of interest are pa id to the raders, with 33 per cent of t hei r loans at 
100-200 per cent rat es of interest, while anoth er 23 per cent of their 
Source 
Landlord 
Traders 
TABLE 3.3 
DISTRIBUTION OF LOANS TO SMALL FARMERS 
ACCORDING TO SOURCE AND RATE OF INTEREST 
(Distribution in Percentages) 
Rate of Interest 
0-10 11-30 31-100 100-200 
63.2 2.2 14.8 19.0 
40.0 3.3 23.4 33.2 
Owner-operator 58.5 2.5 18.6 20.4 
Church 13.0 12.0 46.0 29.0 
Bank 8.6 48.0 43.2 
Others 60.7 2.3 17.4 19.4 
Not stated 68.0 1.2 12.0 18.5 
Source: Central Statistical Office, Second Round 
National Sample Surveys, 1963-68, A.A. 
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Total 
$E 
('000) 
1,981.0 
9,860.3 
20,315.3 
1,257.1 
70.0 
24,796.0 
641.4 
loans earn 30-100 per cent. The church comes next, with 29 per cent of 
their loans at rates of interest from 100-200 per cent and 46 per cent 
of their loans are given at 31-100 per cent rates of interest or more. 
The owner-operators provide 18.5 per cent of their loans at rates of 
interest between 30 per cent and 100 per cent, and a further 20 per cent 
of their loans at more than 100 per cent interest. 
All of this can be seen from Table 3.3. Small farmers find it 
very difficult to get loans at reasonable terms of interest. But since 
the loans are essential to meet some basic needs such as food and 
clothing they have to borrow. 
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3 . 2 Institutional Agricultural Credit 
The provision of agricultural loans by major credit institutions 
is not very effective in Ethiopia . To date banks an d similar institutions 
have neither displayed sufficient interest nor provided sufficient funds 
to the rural sector. 
3.2.1 Commercial Banks 
Although the Commercial Bank of Ethiopia (CRE) extends credit 
to the agricultural sector, this forms an almost ne gligible share of total 
agricultural loans. The Commercial Bank of Ethiopia grants short-term 
loans to large scale farmers and agro-industries with adequate security. 
The commercial banks have been caut i ous in providing agricultural credit, 
partly because of the difficulties and risks of such credit compared with 
commercial credit, and partly because of the interest rate structure, 
controlled by the National Bank. In 1972, for example, the maximum allow-
able interest payable to depositors was 6 per cent on one year deposits. 
This made it difficult to attrac t sufficient longer t e rm savings to sup-
port longer term agricultural credit. 
3 . 2.2 The Agro-Industrial Development Bank (AIDB) 
This bank i s State owne d (formed in 1970 through the merger 
of the 20-year old Development Bank of Ethiopia and the Ethiopian Invest-
ment Corporation) and finances agricultural and industrial development. 
The Agro-Industrial Development Bank (AIDB) does not approve 
loans unless the bank is assured t hat the farmers can manage the proposed 
agricultural enterprise proper ly. In general, it does not provide more 
than 50 per cent of the to tal cost or take more than 30 per cent of 
equity in a company. The rate of interest charged by the bank in 1970 
varied from 8 to 8.5 per cent for long te rm loans (repayment period more 
than 5 years) to 9-11 per cent for short term loans (les s than one year). 
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More than 85 per cent, i.e., 136 loans or $E13 million ($US6.3 million) 
was for agricultural purposes of its total 154 loans amounting to 
$E16 million). The 136 loans amounting to $E13 million were approved as 
follows: 22 for less than $ElO,OOO; 85 for $ElO,OOO to $E50,000; 24 for 
$E50,000 to $E200,000 , and 5 for over $E200,000 (AIDB, Annual Report 
1970). 
3.2.3 Agricultural Inputs and Marketing Services (AIMS) 
AIMS was established in 1972 as a share company under the 
commercial code. It is a subsidiary of the AIDB, which holds over 90 per 
cent of its shares . The main purposes for which the company was estab-
lished are set out in its Memorandum of Association: 
(a) Import, procure and market agricultural inputs 
such as fertilizers, seeds, pesticides, herbi-
cides apd implements; 
(b) Provide "operational facilities" to farners and 
agricultural co-operatives; 
(c) Provide co-operatives, agricultural development 
projects and individual farmers with agricultural 
inputs on credit; and 
(d) Provide warehouses for storing cereals (AIDB, 1972). 
As at mid-1972, AIMS was still in the process of being set up. 
Policy guidelines were in the course of preparation. It is clear that 
for some time to come AIMS will have to rely heavily on its parent AIDB 
for management support. 
The distribution of ferti lize r will serve briefly to illus-
trate how this agency operates . At present, to obtain fertilizer from 
the bank, AIMS' clients make a down payment of 25 per cent of the cost 
and pay back the remainder from the proceeds of their harvest. 
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Allocation of fertiliser to the various farm categories in 1972 was as 
follows: 
TABLE 3.4 
ALLOCATION OF FERTILISER BY AIDB, 1972 
Type of fertiliser (tons) Cash 
Organisation Sulphate Triple Value Dap Urea super- $E 
ammonia phosphate 
For co-operatives 
and individual 
farmers 3,905.75 143.6 1,420,479 
For small farmers 
(CADU) 8,298.3 
For small farmers 
(WADU) 670.0 50.0 5.0 
Minimum package 
programs 
TOTAL 
1,815.0 276.0 
14,689.05 419.6 50.0 5.0 
Source: Agro-Industrial Development Bank, 
Facts and Figures, 1972. 
2,668,733 
213,540 
650,586 
4,953,338 
The fertilisers allocated to the various co-operatives and other farm 
organisations are eventually distributed to farmers. However, this is a 
small amount in view of the number of small farmers requiring credit. 
This activity, however, is only a very modest start in an 
approach to the credit problem. These institutions are still not playing 
a very effective role in the provision of rural credit. Table 3.5 shows 
that institutional credit received by farmers is very low compared with 
some other African count ries. In 1974, such credit was received by a 
little over one per cent of Ethiopian farmers and was equivalent to 
1.6 per cent of the value of farm production. 
TABLE 3.5 
PROPORTION OF FARMERS RECEIVING INSTITUTIONAL CREDIT AND RELATION BETWEEN 
CREDIT SUPPLY AND VALUE OF AGRICULTURAL OUTPUT, 1974 
Number of farmers 
Total institutional lending Total 
to agriculture agricultural 
Country Receiving 
out]~ut 
Million 
Total institutional % SUS 
Million 
credit SUS 
Ethiopia 4,000,000 50,000 1 18 1,120 
Ghana 800,000 25,000 3 45 910 
Ivory Coast 500,000 75,000 15 6 373 
Kenya 1,200,000 200,000 17 131 474 
Swaziland 40,000 3,000 7 5 33 
Tanzania 1,500,000 70,000 4 96 430 
Upper Volta 500,000 32,000 6 1.8 138 
Madagascar 700,000 44,000 6 29.0 372 
Malawi 400,000 33,000 8 1.1 167 
Zambia 450,000 15,000 3 20 116 
Source: Agricultural Credit in Africa, FAO, 1974. 
Credit in 
relation to 
ouq~ut 
% 
2 
4 
2 
27 
15 
22 
1 
8 
0.7 
17 
V1 
0\ 
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3.3 The Agricultural Package Projects 
The Government, with foreign assistance, has initiated in cer-
tain areas Comprehensive Package Projects in which farm inputs are distri-
buted to farmers on credit . In these projects, such as the Chilalo Agri-
cultural Development Unit, Wollamo Agricultural Development Unit and the 
Minimum Package Projects, co-operatives are very important components and, 
where they have already been established, credit is channelled through 
them. The first two deal only with a very small geographical area, but 
the Minimum Package Project tries to reach farmers on a nationwide scale. 
Nevertheless, all these schemes are important for the illumin-
ation they give to Ethiopia's rural problems. 
3.3.1 Chilalo Agricultural Development Unit (CADU) 
The Chilalo Agricultural Development Unit (CADU) is a project 
assisted by the Swedish International Development Authority . Chilalo is 
one of the three administrative sub-divisions in Arussi province which is 
a province of individual tenures. Chilalo has an estimated 400,000 
inhabitants including some 57,000 farm households. The total size of the 
administrative unit is about 10,000 square kilometres, or 1,000,000 hec-
tares (CADU, 1973). Two basic types of agricultural production exist 
side by side in the area, the peasant farming of cereals on small holdings 
and the commercial mechanised farming of large tracts of land. 
The sale of agricultural inputs on credit to farmers is but one, 
albeit a major one, of CADU's activities. CADU is a system for develop-
ment with credit as one of several activities (see Figure 3.2). 
During the work of the project preparation team, the Swedish 
Government tried to put pressure on the Ethiopian Government to implement 
land reform. It referred to the warning of Myrdal, in world context: 
FIGURE 3.2 
THE BASIC ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT STRATEGY 
UTILISED BY THE CADU PROJECT 
Markets 1 ) Credit Inputs Extension 
Demonstration 
Source: J. Cohan, CADU, A Program 
Intermediary for Foreign 
Assistance in Ethiopia, 
1972. 
Anticipated 
land tenure 
reform 
1 
""1' 
SERVI CES 
Crop production, animal 
production 
Implements development 
Forests and conservation 
Infrastructure 
Health, water, 
Co-operatives, community 
development, local 
interest stimulation, etc. 
Economic 
development 
V1 
(X) 
"What is needed is a co-ordinated attack on equality, 
poverty and low productivity, where land reform, 
community develop~nt, agricultural extension services, 
co-operation and many other efforts towards rural 
uplift are not isolated from each other but planned and 
pursued as a combined policy . More specifically, with-
out measures to reduce monopoly over land ownership, 
it is unrealistic to expect t hese other reform efforts 
to accomplish much." (Myrdal, 1966). 
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Since it is difficult for a developing nation in the circumstances 
of Ethiopia simultaneously to introduce tenure reforms, services and the 
provision of capital inputs, it can be argued that land reform might no t 
initially lead to increased economic growth. Land reform is not enough 
because only through a long range program of provid 'ng services and sup-
plies can peasants under reformed tenure be brought into the market economy 
(Warriner, 1968). 
Since it was clear at the beginning of the project that land 
reform could not be fo~thcoming, the provision of services and capital 
inputs as a starting point was agreed upon. However, Cohen (1972) pointed 
out that in the Indian package programs, the small farmers tended to sell 
their inputs and the well-off farmers used too many (CADU, 1972). Thus, 
without reforms the subsistence producers get little help and the large 
landowners receive the bulk of the benefits. Cohen further states that 
since the basic aim of the project was to benefit tenants and small land-
owners, the risk of this starting point had to be avoide d. Hence, the 
only realistic strategy was to begin by trying to bring the peasants into 
a market economy by offering the possibility of selling their agricultural 
produce at a fair and stable price (Cohen, 1972). The idea was that as 
the peasant came to understand the incentives of market production, he 
would more readily accept the utilisation of improved inputs. In turn, 
the utilisation would be stimulated by the offering of attractive and 
simple credit facilities, as well as the demonstration of benefits from 
new inputs by extension. In the process, the CADU officials would supply 
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a number of services in order to stimulate the entire process and at the 
same time hope that the Government would deliver some type of tenure 
reform. The strategy is illustrated in Figure 3.2. 
The other aspect of the project's strategy relates to the 
improvement of the local population's ability to participate in the 
development process. Toward this end the project aimed at making the 
target population aware of the possibilities of development and stimu-
lating needs which their co-operation and activity could fulfill. The 
overall participation strategy is illustrated in Figure 3.3. 
The first steps taken by the project in 1967 and 1968 were to 
introduce trading centres which offered farmers the possibility of 
selling milk and wheat at fair prices. Milk and wheat were retailed 
because the area was best suited for such production and favourable 
markets were anticipated (Cohen, 19 72). One of the objects of this 
process was to influence market prices upward through CADU-introduced 
competition, in anticipation that higher prices would influence the 
target population towards a market orientation. In the process, CADU 
bought grain and milk from al l farmers in order to reduce operating 
costs by increasing volume and lowering sales costs. 
The purchases of milk in this area of market stimulation are 
given in Table 3.6. 
Although the milk production market shm~ed increased collections 
for the first three years, it dropped significantly in 1970-71. The main 
reason for this drop appears to be that farmers find wheat cultivation 
more profitable than cattle husbandry and that development is creating 
land utilisation pressures on former pasture land. 
FIGURE 3 . 3 
THE BASIC TARGET POPULATION PARTICIPATION STRATEGY UTILISED BY THE CADU PROJECT 
Local Government Officials 
District Development Committee 
Farmers' Committee 
Self He l p Projects 
(water, education, roads) 
Direct CADU Contact 
Co-operat ives 
Women's groups 
Youth groups 
Information activities 
Functional literacy 
. Target Population 
(Tenants and small 
landowners) 
~ 
Economic and Social 
~ I Development from 
Other Strategies 
Source: John M. Cohen, CADU, A Program Intermediary for Foreign Assistance 
in Ethiopia, 1972 . 
Increased awareness 
and part icipat i on 
in development process 
(J'\ 
~ 
Year 
1967-68 
1968-69 
1969-70 
1970-71 
1971-72 
TABLE 3.6 
MILK PURCHASED BY CADU MILK COLLECTION STATIONS 
1967-68 TO 1970-71 
Number of Litres 
stations collected 
1 4,000 
1-5 136,000 
6 318,000 
8 159,000 
9 147,113 
Source: CADU, Planning and Evaluation Sect ion. 
The addit ional income accruing to farmers 
represents the price increment paid by 
CADU above tradit i ona l market prices. 
Marketing Division, Annual Report 1971-72 . 
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Additional 
income 
accruing to 
farmer 
($E) 
600 
20, 400 
47,700 
23,850 
22 ,066 
The principal plough culture cr ops are wheat, barley and flax. 
For market-oriented reasons, CADU primarily entered int o the purchas e of 
wheat but gradually expanded into barley and flax as well. The purchase 
of wheat, barley and flax in this area of market stimulation is shown in 
Table 3.7. 
It is seen that the program expanded vary rap idly through 1971 
and then experienced a decline in 1972. The forecasted number of credit 
takers in 1972 had been between 20,000 and 25,000 and the decline was 
unexpected. It has been suggest e d that t he falling of wheat pr ices pro-
vided a major explanation . In 1971 CADU paid farmers an average price of 
$E23.l5 per quintal for wheat grains and in 1972 the price was $El9.l9 . 
This f all in the price of the farmers' major cash crop may have served 
to restrain them from buying inputs (Holmberg, 1972) . Further, it should 
be noted that an unusually large volume of fertiliser was sold for cash 
1967/68 
1968/69 
1969/70 
1970/71 
1971/72 
TABLE 3.7 
WHEAT, BARLEY AND FLAX PURCHASES AND COST /BENEFITS BY CADU TRADE CENTRES 
1967/68-1970 
(quintals) 
480 
2,300 
6,314 
23,980 
93,887 
W H EAT BAR LEY 
(value increase) (quintals) (value increase) (quintals) 
1,440 
6,900 
18,942 
71,9 40 520 1,560 
281,661 12,149 36,450 
Source: CADU Cost/Benefit, 1971. 
The "value increase" figures represent the 
price which CADU has paid above traditional 
market prices. This has averaged $E3/quint a1 
for wheat and barley and $E4/quinta1 for flax . 
CADU, Marketing Division, Annual Report 1971-72. 
710 
798 
6,100 
3,327 
F L A X 
(value increase) 
2,840 
3,192 
24,400 
13,308 
0\ 
W 
Year 
1967/68 
1968/69 
1969/70 
1970/71 
1971/72 
TABLE 3.8 
AMOUNT OF CREDIT AND NUMBER OF BENEFICIARIES 
EXTENDED BY CADU,1968/69 TO 1971/72 
Number of Total amotmt 
extended beneficiaries ($E) 
189 15,700 
868 154,461 
4 ,7 69 502,875 
14, 146 1,437,517 
12,480 1,063,120 
Source: Johan Holmberg, CADU, The Credit Program 
of CADU, 1972. A.A. 
and the volume that was sold on credit was smaller. This is further 
illustrated in the sale of other inputs. 
TABLE 3.9 
SALES OF QUINTALS OF IMPROVED WHEAT AND FERTILISERS BY CADU, 
1967/68 TO 1970/71 
Improved wheat Fertiliser 
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Year (in quintals) (in quintals) 
1967/68 1,400 25 
1968/69 5,465 3,431 
1969/70 8,250 15,670 
1970/71 14,600 45,325 
1971/72 4,664 34,990 
Source: CADU, Cost/Benefit, 1972; 
CADU, Marketing Division, Annual Report 1971/72. 
Note: These figures include sales on both cash and 
credit bases. 
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In 1970-71, CADU bought wheat at $E23.50 per quintal and sold 
it in larger markets for $E27.50 per quintal, with fertiliser purchased 
at $E33.05 per ton and sold at $E38 per ton (CADU, Annual Report, 1970-71). 
The margins were used merely to cover the administration of the marketing 
process, transport and storage costs. 
This project has been, therefore, quite successful. able 3 .10 
illustrates CADU's credit program over the years 1968-71 for tenants and 
landowners of various sizes. The table shows that CADU's credit program 
has gradually been able to improve its achievement as regards "directing 
the activities towards farmers in the lower income brackets" (Holmberg, 
1972). 
In the initial years of the credi t program, participants in 
input and credit programs tended to be outside the target population of 
tenants and small lanqowners. For greater clarity, the target population 
was considered to be owners with less than 25 hectares and tenants with 
l ess than 40 hectares. By 1970 a dramatic turnabout resulted from major 
modifications of the credit program by restricting clients to the 
original target population. Cultivators of over 20 hectares were excluded 
from the scheme . The group then excluded were proving, rather surprisingly, 
the greater credit risks (Holmberg, 1973). 
In terms of the benefits accruing from the marketing, inputs, 
credit and extension activities, the project seems to be a very sound 
investment. The total net project cost, total minimum benefits and 
internal rate of return are set forth in Table 3.11 and they indicate 
that after an initial period of heavy investment, total minimum benefits 
are rapidly approaching the gross cost of the project. The benefits of 
the project were at first generated solely by the rise of improved wheat 
Tenants 
Landowners -
1-10 ha 
11-20 
21-40 
Above 40 
* Unknowns 
TOTAL 
* 
TABLE 3.10 
NUMBER OF CADU CREDIT TAKERS AND DISTRIBUTION OF GROSS BENEFITS BY LAND TENURE 
AND SIZE OF HOLDING, 1968-1970 
196 8 1 9 6 9 1 9 7 0 1 9 7 1 
Credit Takers Value Credit Takers Value Credit Takers Value Credit Takers 
No. % % No. % % No. % % No. % 
16 8.5 3.53 134 15.4 5 .5 1540 32.3 22.7 5392 38.1 
81 42.8 14.75 438 50 . 5 29.1 1903 39.9 37.2 8212 58.1 
36 19.0 19.3 144 16.6 21.9 441 9.3 17.9 387 2.7 
21 11.1 29.3 66 7.6 12.8 179 3.8 8.9 80 0.6 
18 9.5 31.1 54 6.2 26.9 54 1.1 3.3 
17 8.9 2.1 32 3.7 4.9 652 13.7 9.8 75 0.5 
189 100.0 100.0 868 100.0 100.0 4769 100.0 100.0 14146 100.0 
Source: J. Holmberg, Credit Program, CADU, 1972. 
Value 
% 
35.8 
58.2 
4.5 
1.5 
100.0 
Unknowns - farmers for whom status of land tenure or areas was not obtained from credit application. ~ ~ 
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TABLE 3.11 
COST/BENEFIT AND INTERNAL RATE OF RETURN BY CADU PROJECT 
Subject 1967/68 1968/69 1969/70 1970/71 
Total minimum 52,080 511,157 1,726,806 3,954,119 
benefits ($E) 52,080 511,157 1,726,806 3,954,119 
Total net project 
cost ($E) 2,880,100 7,312,500 3,660,800 5,636,400 
Difference ($E) 2,828,020 6,801,343 1,933,994 1,682,211 
Internal rate 
of return 5% 13% 20% 
Source: CADU, Cost/Benefit, p.5. Annual Report, 1970-71. 
seeds. However, as of 1970-71 , the benefits were due to fertiliser and 
* improved wheat together, as illustrated in Table 3.9. 
The whole of the CADU credit system can be viewed as consisting 
of four distinct sub-systems: 
* 
(a) advice on and demonstration of the benefits of 
new agricultural inputs and practices; 
(b) devising a credit system that is geared towards 
the needs of farmers - in particular those who 
normally have no ready access to lending institutions) 
and one that is both effective and inexpensive to 
administer; 
(c) screening of credit-worthy farmers and making the 
recommended inputs available at the time and place 
needed; and 
In 1967/68, wheat alone amounted to 82.1 per cent of benefits, whereas 
in 1970/71 wheat amounted to only 10 per cent. Fertiliser on wheat has 
increased from 7.1 per cent of 1967/68 figures to 85.8 per cent of 
1970/71 figures (CADU, Annual Report, 1970-71, p.7.). 
(d) creating a mechanism an set of procedures 
designed to ensure maximum area coverage and 
minimal default. 
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The CADU package project can be seen to have been a quite 
successful vehicle for rural improvement in terms of increased produc-
tivity. Its success in this regard has been vitiated, however, by the 
increasing mechanisation forcing tenant farmers off the land, as will be 
seen later in this chapter. 
3.3.2 Wo1lamo Agricultural Development Unit (WADU) 
WADU is the Wollamo Agricultural Development Unit in Sidamo 
individual tenure province. This project is financed mostly by the 
International Development Association (IDA). WADU has been set up under 
the general direction of the Extension and Project Implementation Depart-
ment (EPID) of the Min~stry of Agriculture. The first phase project was 
assisted by a $US3.5 million credit from IDA, which was expected to be 
ful ly disbursed by the end of June 1974. 
The overall objective of WADU, initiated in 1970, is: 
(a) to raise the current incomes of some 6,000 existing 
subsistence farmers in the Soddo and Bo10ssi Weredas 
(subdistricts) in the highlands of Wollamo district, 
and 
(b) to establish a total of 1,750 settlers in Abela and 
Be1e areas, situated in the lowlands of the district, 
so that they can obtain a yearly income of $425. 
The package of activities over the whole district included training of 
staff and farmers, promotion of co-operatives, marketing assistance, 
construction of se ondary roads and tracks and agronomic trials, in 
addition to the main activities of farm credit and crop extension. 
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It has been estimated by the project and the World Bank that 
t he costs by way of the roads, farm access tracks, conservation drains, 
bush clearing and disc ploughing, etc, for settling the new farmers would 
be over $E422,000 in the first year, gradually declining to about $Ell,OOO 
f rom the ninth year onwards (see Table 3.12). The average settlement costs 
per farmer would be about $E6l4. The project expects to recover these 
settlement costs at 7 per cent interest from the farmers over a 20-year 
period. It is, therefore , expected that the newly-sett l ed farmers shall 
star t paying a development fee of $E58 per annum f rom the fourth year 
onwar ds (IBRD Report, 1972). 
For the 1972 growing season, 7,500 farmers were registered; 
many more than th i s number applied but could not yet be accommodated owing 
to limitations of finance and adminis t rative capacity. 
However, there was no such proposal for the existing farmers. 
It is estimated that the existing farmers would gain a "net" incremental 
income of $E76 in the second year, $E177 in the third year and $E2l2 from 
the fourth year onwards. The most important outcome of WADU, phase 1, was 
the receptiveness of existing small farmers to extension advice and the 
rapid development of co-operatives and annual credit. By the end of 
phase 1 it is estimated that 10,000 farmers will be participating in the 
project as against the maximum of 6,000 farmers estimated at appraisal 
(WADD, 1973). 
WAD V Credit Policy 
Credit was to be issued in two forms; credit in kind for farm 
inputs which would constitute over 95 per cent of the total, and the 
balanc would consist of cash advances. Inputs would be supplied by 
AIDB/AIMS t o WADD. Distribution within the project area was a WADU/ 
co-operative union responsibility. WADD would act as AIDB~s agen in 
TABLE 3.12 
ESTIMATED VALUE OF FARMERS'BENEFITS FROM WADD, 1972 
(in $E) 
No. of Costs of Value of additional output 
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Year farmers inputs per farmer gross net (net) 
1 1,000 67,500 146,770 79,270 79 
2 1,600 166,400 563,530 397,130 248 
3 2,500 318,700 1,192,710 874,010 350 
4 3,400 485,000 1,884,300 1,399,300 412 
5 3,700 574,400 2,354,790 1,780,390 482 
6 3,700 599,600 2,579,010 1,979,410 535 
7 3,700 607,400 2,740,200 2,132,800 576 
8 3,700 609,800 2,805,8 70 2,196,070 594 
9 3,700 610,100 2,816,760 2,206,660 596 
Source: Planning and Implementation Dnit, Ministry of Agricult ure, 
1972. 
processing farmers applications, in maintaining records and in collecting 
repayments (no deposit). This would be an important difference from the 
Minimum Package Project and the progress of the t wo credit programs would 
be carefully monitored to determine which was more productive. Interest 
would be charged at the rate of one per cent per mon h. Cash advances 
were to be made from a revolving fund operated by WADD (WADD, 1973). This 
again was to be a feature peculiar to WADD, and the success would be 
closely evaluated . Phase 1 experience, albeit of short duration, suggests 
that cash advances are an important means of releasing farmers from 
reliance on merchant lenders. This is expensive and restricts the 
opportunity to market produce advantageously. 
No special provision has been made for mediurnrterm credit. 
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Should demand rise amongst the members of well established viable 
societies for sprayers, improved implements, etc., it would be met from 
the short-term credit fund. The amounts are expected to be negligible. 
In the interests of not overburdening young societies, no attempt is to 
be made to stimulate demand for such credit. 
3.3.3 Minimum Package Proj ects (MPP) 
The Minimum Package Probram (MPP) is an extension program on 
a nationwide scale based upon CADU's experiences. To make the extension 
service more effective in performing the task of disseminating new 
techniques, the "minim~ package" app roach was adopted. This implies a 
c o-ordinated effort of demonstration of new techniques and of making 
inputs and credit available to farmers. 
The Extension and Project Implementation Department (EPID) of 
the Ministry of Agriculture was established in 1971 with the assistance of 
Swedish International Development Authority (SIDA) to administer the 
extension program. 
In the selection of areas for intensified extension activities, 
attempts are made to include areas representative of the whole country. 
Criteria for selection of project areas include: 
(a) availability of suitable and well-tested innovations; 
(b) favourable demand prospects for crops that can be grown; 
(c) importance of small scale farming; 
(d) all-weather accessibility; 
(e) previous experience of effects of introducing relevant 
innovations, and 
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(f) attitudes of the farmers (EPID, 1971). 
The activities of the MPP are carried out in three types of 
areas: Observation Areas (OA); Demonstration Areas (DA), and Minimum 
Package Project Areas (MPPA). These three types of areas represent 
the success i ve stages in the development of an area under the MPP. 
When an area has been designated to be subject to extension 
activities one extension agent is assigned to the area which then becomes 
an ~A. This agent is responsible for laying out production trials and 
for a general survey of the area. 
Depending upon the results from the observation period, which 
normally lasts for two years, the advancement of the OA to a DA or the 
termination of further project activities in the OA is decided upon. 
The main criteria used as a basis for this decision are the results from 
the crop trials, the interest of farmers in the area, the accessibility of 
the area, the distribution of all project ac tivities throughout the country, 
and the general potential of the area for agricult ural development. 
When advanced to a DA, one supervisor, one additional extension 
agent, and one marketing assistant are assigned to the area. In each of 
* the two agricultural extension areas five model farmers are selected and 
demonstration plots laid out on their fields. Under the guidance of the 
supervisor, demonstrations of innovations are initiated and inputs made 
available to farmers on cash and credit terms. 
Normally one year later the area is advanced to a MPPA, although 
this time period can be longer if the farmers' response is poor. When a 
MPPA is established, it is staffed by one supervisor, five agricultural 
* A model farmer is a farmer elected by the other farmers. Criteria for 
selection are: That he is a full-time farmer' that the area he 
cultivates should not be far from the road; that he should have good 
moral reputation and that he should be receptive to new ideas. This 
is the project requirement for the model farmer . 
extension agents and up to five marketing assistants, depending on the 
volume of input sales anticipated in the area. 
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A model MPPA is located along an all-weather road, exten ding 
roughly 75 kilometres and encompassing a band of 3-5 kilometres on each 
side of the road. It is divided into five agricultural extension areas, 
each with a combined extension office/marketing centre. Each of these 
five extension areas should include some 2,000 farmers and the MPPA should 
thus cover approximately 10,000 farmers (EPID, 1973). It should be 
remembered that the model farmers act as extension agents once they h ave 
been convinced. The agricultural extension agent manages a field for 
trials and demonstrations near the office. He is also in charge of 
selecting model farmers, laying out demonstration plots for them, con-
ducting demonstrations for farmers of improved inputs, advising farmers 
of the use of the improved inputs and techniques. The marketing assist ant 
is responsible for the distribution of inputs and for credit oper ations. 
In May 1972, 18 MPP areas, 12 demonstration areas and about 
40 observation areas were in operation. 
In the provision of credit, EPID acts as an agent of AIDB 
within the MP areas and with the following restrictions! 
(a) loans can only be given in kind and for the 
following inputs: seed, fertilisers, 
herbicides, pesticides, tools, farm implements 
and building materials for storage facilities; 
(b) credit is presen ly granted for, at most, 
75 per cent of the total cost of the inputs; 
(c) only farmers with holdings of 20 hectares or 
less qualify; 
(d) loans shall have a duration of less than one year; 
(e) a written agreement shall be made and loans shall 
be secured by the personal guarantee of two persons 
of good repute in the region; 
(f) farmers will be charged a rate of one per cent per 
month for nine months; and 
(g) if 90 per cent of the borrowers in any sub-area 
(model farmer area) have not repaid their loans in 
full within two months of the due date, no further 
credit operations shall be undertaken in the area. 
No farmer with an outstanding loan will be eligible 
for a new loan (EPID, 1972). 
Input Sales 
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The results from the 1971 and 1972 distribution seasons are 
presented in Table 13 .. The 1972 figures should be regarded as preliminary 
since all data from areas had not been submitted. 
The figures show that, compared to the target, goal achievement 
was very good in 1972 while lagging somewhat behind 1971. The figures 
also indicate that farmer participation has been as planned, while the 
amount of inputs taken per farmer was less than planned. Distribution 
of improved seed is seriously lagging behind. This is due to staff short-
ages and a lack of preparation so that some field activities could not 
be implemented in time. This applied particularly to activities that had 
to be carried out before or during the 1971 planting season, i.e., 
selection of model farmers, establishment of demonstration fields and 
surveys of farming conditions. 
TABLE 3.13 
MPP INPUT SALES, 1971 AND 1972 
1 9 7 1 
Subject Actual as 
Plan Actual percentage Plan 
of plan 
Dap, ton 1,310 810 62 2,100 
Urea, ton 192.5 136 71 300 
Seed, ton 45.5 22 47 26 
Input, value $E 575,000 360,000 63 910,000 
Number of 
participating 
farmers 6 , 000 4,691 78 12,750 
Source: EPID, Annual Report, publ. No.13, A.A., 1973 
197 2 
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(a) Seeds 
Secondly, the agricultural extension activities have been 
particularly uns uccessful as regards the introduction of new seed 
var ieties. The main reason for the poor result seems to be that the 
project has not yet evolved a policy for the production of seed. The 
project was purchasing from a few s t ations causing excessively high 
transport costs. Differences in ecology and ensuing adaptation problems 
have also contributed to t he poor result. By 1972, a consultant study 
on seed production was carried out. The study proposed to remedy the 
situat i on by initiating local seed production on contract within the 
Minimum Package Program a rea. In addition, local testing and demon-
stration of new varieties has been given more weight in the agricultural 
extension work and the number o f variety demonstrations on model farms 
was increased from 29 in 197 1 t o 550 in 1972 (EPID, 1973). 
(b ) Fertilisers 
Chemical fertiliser is the most important input which all 
these projects stimulate t he farmer to use. About 2,500 trials carried 
out in many parts of the Emp i re since 1965 under the Freedom from Hunger 
Campaign of the United Nations Food and Agricultural Organisation (FAO) 
have shown conclusively that the application of fertiliser (NP 18/46 
containing 18 kg pure nitrogen and 46 kg P20s per 100 kg fertiliser) to 
cereal crops gives a highly profitable response. The p resent price of 
fertiliser has , however, discouraged farmers from using it and even if 
it is used, the quantity has been greatly reduced. 
Planning for the Minimum Package Program is based on an average 
yield increase equal to only 80 per cent of that obtained in these trials. 
On this basis , application of one quintal (100 kg) of diamonium phosphate 
(DAP) per hectare will increase the quantity and value of output by the 
following amounts (values are calculated on the basis of long-run average 
farmclevel prices assumed for planning purposes by the Ministry of 
Agricultur ): 
teff 4.3 quintals/hectare, worth $84 
wheat 5.4 " " " $94 
Diminishing returns set as in fertilisation continues. The first year 
fertiliser gives a benefit/cost ratio for wheat of about 2.5:1; the 
second and third years, about 1.5:1 and improved wheat seed gives a 
benefit cost ratio 2.3:1. 
(c) Implements 
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The CADU Research Implement Unit has developed and tested a 
$20 spike-tooth harrow which covers the seed in a manner that substa -
tially improves seed germination. Observation indicates that proper 
use of this harrow increases yields by yet another 2.8 quintals per 
hectare in the case of wheat; 2.3 quintals per hectare for barley, and 
4 . 8 quintals per hectare for sorghum. An improved $40 plough developed 
by the same unit saves time and enables the farmer to cultivate a 
lar ger area, although there is no evidence that it raises the yield per 
hectare. These implements have not yet reached outside the projects 
andcould not even meet the demand within the project. 
3.3.4 The Impact of Agric ltural Modernisation on Tenant Farmers 
In an agricultural economy where tenancy is a major form of 
land tenure, such as in Ethiopia, to ensure that the majority of farmers 
share in the benefits of growth it is not enough to pr ide mod rn inputs, 
credit and other services. Bas'c institutional reforms are also necessary 
t o provide the tenant farmer with sec lrity against eviction and incentives 
to use the inp ts. The problem of eviction arises because the modern-
isation of agriculture brings wit it a basic change in attitudes towards 
land and relationships among the different classes of rural society. 
CADU's credi t program has undoubtedly had an undesirable effecL on land 
tenure. As a result of the increasing yields within the project area, 
the value of land and hence land rents has increased. 
The landlord and his descendants begin to regard each piece 
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of land, no longer as an unchanging element in a system of traditional 
rights and obligations vis-a-vis one's tenants, but rather as an economic 
asset capable of yielding, with the requisite investment, a much hi gher 
income than the owner's present share of the tenant's crop. Acceptance 
of the traditional obligations of th e landlord dissol ves a the prospect 
of the high returns obtainable by evicting one's tenants and farmin g a 
large area with hired labour and modern inputs, tractors and other farm 
machinery. 
Often the first to perceive these opportunities is not the 
traditional landowner and his family but civil servants, merchant s and 
other city dwellers, w~o either buy land for a higher price than the 
owner ever thought it worth, or hire it from him a t a higher r ental 
than he ever collected from his tenants. Thus the tenants are either 
forced off the land when mechanised wage labour farming is introduced or 
to pay much higher rentals. 
The CADU project administration study indicated that 18 pe r 
cent of the northern project area, equivalent to 24 to 30 per cent of 
the land in that region which i s suitable for mechanised farming, has 
com under tract or cultivation, most of it since CADU started operation. 
As a res ult some 600 to 750 tenants, or 20 to 25 per cent of all those 
farming in the mid-1960s, had been evicted by the end of 1970, most of 
them leaving f or no specifi c destination (CADU, 19 73) . The Government 
has not re-settled them on its own l an ds found nearby . On the other hand , 
there is some evidence t hat the demand for labour wi thin agriculture in 
Chilalo is increasing, creating an upward pressure on wage rates. While 
some of the displace d tenants ~y find employment as farm work rs , many 
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will have to migrate and settle elsewhere. It is apparent that the 
social costs of this tenant displacement in any benefit/cost calculation 
for CADU as a whole would have to reduce the benefits generated by the 
project. 
The effect of insistence on mortgage security for credit, where 
credit is necessary to produce a large productive increases available, 
is to favour the large capitalist owner prepared to work his own lands 
(even as an absentee) and to eliminate or squeeze out the small holder who 
cannot qualify for credit on that available system. 
This chapter has described the larger rural credit institutions 
in Ethiopia. They have been seen to have very limited effect. The con-
tribution of the banking systems to rural credit is so far confined almost 
entirely to some restricted lending to co-operatives. The CADU and WADU 
programs serve only small areas and directly affect relatively few people. 
The Minimum Package Programs have a wider effect and penetrate to both the 
individual and communal tenure provinces, the Comprehensive and Minimum 
Package Programs together so far reach only about 5 per cent of Ethiopia's 
agricultural areas (Figure 3.1). Obviously this is not yet a sufficient 
basis for nation-wide rural development. 
CADU has some importance, however, because it is the model upon 
which the MPp's credit facilities are based. The MPPs have t aken CADU's 
experience and attempted to apply it throughout Ethiopia. The MPPs are 
limited in their scope by the lack of all-weather secondary roads and 
other infrastructure in most of rural Ethiopia, which confines them largely 
to the rural population situated by the main road. But they are of 
significance in that they operate their credit institutions 'n both 
individual and communal tenure provinces. Also, their credit institutions 
utilise land saving (fertilisers, improved seeds, etc.) in both the 
communal and individual tenure provinces. Improved farm implements (labour 
saving device) are in the process of being adopted in the individua l 
tenure province of Arussi. These two latter points are of particular 
interest in what fo llows and Chapters 5 and 6 of the analysis will 
provide a basis for a further rationalisation and refinement of this 
aspect of the MPP policy. 
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Chapter 4 following, outlines some of the special difficulties 
and limitations attending the provision of rural credit in Ethiopia . 
Attention is paid to the problems of small farmers inside and outside 
the projects . 
CHAPTER 4 
FACTORS INHIBITING THE USE OF CREDIT 
FOR RURAL PRODUCTION 
This chapter is concerned with factors inhibiting the use of 
credit for rural production and, consequently, hindering the potential 
growth of agricultural production and limiting rural living standards. 
The analys is of the present situation in Ethiopia is based 
on personally conducted field surveys, meetings and interviews at 
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central and local levels, and indicates a range of factors which affect 
the demand for credit to differing degrees. For example, we can 
differentiate between those factors relevant to the majority of potential 
applicants and those affecting specific categories of farmers as a 
result of their activities or particular credit needs. 
Before detailing the various factors involved, groups of 
farmers outlined in the terms of reference for the survey were: 
(a) small farmers both inside and outside the 
Minimum Package Programs; 
(b) commercial farmers both inside and outside 
the AID Bank's terms of refer nce; and 
(c) large agricultural and business undertakings. 
Our analysis is limited only to (a), i.e., small farmers both 
inside and outside the MPPs. But we will also include those of the 
Comprehensive Package such as WADU, CADU, etc. 
The analysis is divided into two main groups: direct and 
indirect factors. 
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4.1 Direct Factors 
4.1.1 Inaccessibility of Farmers 
The lack of rural infrastructure is an important constraint on 
the demand for credit. Out of an estimated total of four million farm 
households, only approximately 700,000 can be described as easily 
accessible; that is, within five kilometres of a road. The Extension and 
Program Implementation Department (EPID) of the Ministry of Agriculture 
(hereafter called EPID) expects to include all of these 700,000 house-
holds in its Minimum Package Program in the next ten years on the 
assumption that it can institute ten new programs per annum. In addition, 
almost 100,000 farmers have been incorporated into the Comprehensive 
Package Projects already, s uch as CADU, WADU, etc., where rural road 
ne t works have been developed . 
Thus there is a considerable gap between the need for roads and 
the rate of their construction despite the efforts made by the Government 
during the last three Five Year Plans. Consequently, extension services 
have been faced with almost insurmountable problems of reaching a large 
proportion of farmers who have thus received little in the way of tech-
nical help or advice in acquiring, controlling and correctly using loans. 
This lack of advice also affects farmers who can finance improvements 
from their own resources, and so the lack of rural infrastructure has 
had serious consequences for the growth of the whole agricultural sector. 
Progress in rural road buildi ng is anticipated in the Fourth 
Five Year Plan (1975-78) but financial constraints and the Imperial 
Highway Authority's emphasis on main roads indicates that it will be 
relatively small. However, there are some rural road programs incor-
porated into development projects, for example: 
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(i) the MPP hopes to build 50 km of rural roads 
in each MPP area by 1975; and 
(ii) the Washed Coffee Project, financed by 
IDA, plans to build 400 km to connect the 100 
new pulperies . 
Although these examples are important, they are only in a small 
area and the lack of effective co-ordination between the Imperial High-
way Authority and the Ministry of Agriculture is hampering the develop-
ment of rural infrastructure, even in the case of on-going projects. 
For example, the Borana Range Land Project and the Wengo Mea Processing 
Unit which , although they have been in existence for several years, are 
not yet accessible by suitable r oads. 
This factor also indirectly affects the growth of demand for 
credit because there are considerable difficulties in marketing farm 
products. 
The available data from the Central Statistical Office indicate 
* that 41.3 per cent of the Wereda capitals located in thirteen provinces 
(except Eritrea, for which data are not available) are accessible by all 
weather roads, 46.2 per cent by dry weather roads, and 12.5 per cent 
by mu e and foot only. 
A national marketing sample survey showed that all farmers 
int erviewed reported that their main marketing problem was the low 
prices they received for their produce and the majority indicated that 
lack of transportation was next in order of importance. All farmers 
utilised animal transport and the time required to reach the market ranged 
* The Ethiopian administrative hierarchy is: Province, subprovince 
(Awraja) and distr'ct CWereda). 
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from two hours to one and a half days. The same survey indicated that 
approximately 76 per cent of the farmers reported that they had no source 
of credi and the remainder obtained credit from local moneylenders or 
from relatives (Ministry of Agriculture Marketing Survey, 1973). It 
should be remembered, however, the farmers in the surveys were outside 
the MPP areas. 
4 . 1.2 Institutional Factors 
Institutional fact ors have worked, by and large, to restrict 
the supply of credit to agriculture rather than the demand for such credit. 
The major areas concerned are outlined below: 
(a) AID Bank Policies 
A proportion of loans rejected by the Bank has resulted from 
the lending policies of the AID Bank (see Table 4.1). This proportion 
was approximately 16 p~r cent of the total applications received in the 
1971-72 financial year, but had fallen to just over 3 per cent of total 
applications fo r the 1972-73 financial year. 
TABLE 4.1 
AID BANK - ANALYSIS OF LOAN APPLICATIONS RECEIVED 
YEA R 
Loans 
Loan applications received 
Loans rejected 
Creditworthiness 
Technical/managerial problems 
Lending policies 
Other 
Loans pending 
Necessary documents not 
produced/acceptable to 
legal department 
1971-72 
239 
52 
2 
5 
41 
4 
64 
123 
Source: AID Bank - unpublished data. 
1972-7 3 
197 
12 
3 
7 
2 
69 
116 
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Lending policy factors consisted primarily of the "$5000 
minimum loan condition", and the "$15,000 total investmen condition". 
It would have been useful to have data on alternative sources of finance 
fly i1 b1 to th 41 reJ ctions due to 1 nding policies in 1971-72 and 
seven in 1972-73, or if, in fact, such sources existed. On the basis of 
1971-72 data only, it could be argued that if these applicants were 
unable to obta'n alternative sources of finance, AID Bank lending policies 
have, to some extent, inhibited the demand for funds. 
It should be remembered, however, that the lending policy does 
not include small farmers who cannot meet the capital requirements The 
AID Bank's credit to small farmers is channelled through co-operatives 
which are part of all comprehensive project areas, such as CADU, WADU and 
MPP. It provides short term credit for fertilisers, improved seeds, 
herbicides and insecticides for funds. In the 1971-72 financial year, 
about 30 per cent of applications received were "loans pending", and in 
the 1972-73 financial year, this proportion had i ncreased to 34 per cent. 
Delays are therefore being felt in the provision of finance as a result of 
the inability of prospective borrowers to produce documents acceptable to 
the legal department of the AID Bank. 
However, there is no information as to the number of potential 
applications informally discouraged on the grounds of lending policy and 
other data relating to potential borrowers; available data relate only to 
formal applications declined. 
(b) Security Requirements 
The author has been unable to find definitive evidence to suggest 
that institutional security requirements have inhibi ed the demand for 
agricultural credit. The following comments are, however, relevant: 
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(i) There appears to have been a preference for town 
property security by the commercial banks and the AID Bank (AID Bank, 
"Policies and Operations", 18/6/71). The extent to which country property 
is unacc ptable will, of course, inhibit demand from the rural populatio 
but there is no readily available evidence on this point. 
(ii) The experience of the Dairy Development Agency in its 
small farm lending program. It seems that the AID Bank is unable to lend 
in cases where the land tenure situation is not clearly defined. This 
automatically excludes all farmers in the communal tenure and the 
individual tenure areas because of the lack of ownership titles. For 
1 nd to be a satisfactory form of security it may be necessary to undertake 
surveys to determine boundaries, provide for simple forms of registration 
of ownership and transfer and consolidate holdings. Hence, such require-
ments are designed for merely the rich farmers. 
(iii) "The AID Bank woul d see, as collateral, mortgages on 
real estates • .. " (Policies and Operation, 18/6/71). It would seem 
that such policy guidelines exclude not only the tenant but all farmers 
whose lands are not registered and cadastrically surveyed. Even if 
there were a well regulated tenancy agreement in Ethiopia, such credit 
policy would not be efficient. Productive capacity should be the basis 
for obtaining credit. Since repayment capacity is dependent on the 
returns from cash crops, an important factor in the situation is the 
proportion of production devoted to subsistence. 
The small farm r has to rely heavily on the traditional money-
lender who is less particular about security and more concerned with the 
economic power which can be obtained, and who has a more intimate know-
ledge of the borrower . 
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(c) Interest Rates 
There is no quantitative evidence that institutional interest 
rate levels have inhibited the demand for funds. This may be the result 
of low interest rate elasticity (as evidenced in other countries), or the 
widespread acceptance by the community of much higher usury rates. 
Complaints were often made during the field survey that interest rates 
were high. 
(d) AID Bank Branch Network 
The present bank network consists of Asmara (Eritrea), Jimma, 
Awassa and Nazareth , thus covering only a small part of t h e country. 
Comm nts have been made by banks that the demand for funds would increase 
if the AID Bank branch network was more extensive, but such a hypothesis 
necessarily remains untested. 
(e) Down Payment Requirements 
It has been reported that the 25 per cent down payment require-
ment of the Minimum Package Program has inhibited the demand for credit, 
particularly from the poorer farmers, in the early stages of the program. 
A lower rate of down payment may be necessary in the poorer areas and in 
the early stages of the program's operat ion in order to encourage par-
ticipation. 
(f) Repayment Terms 
Credit from commercial banks is generally of a short term 
"crop finance" nature, for up to six months . Credit from the AID Bank 
can be gained for a longer term. There are no data from the AID Bank on 
the breakdown of loans according to term. However, from qualitative 
evidence, it does appear that there is a shortage of finance, apart from 
that of a dealer, of the one to three years' medium term type . If a 
source of such finance were readily identifiable, the demand for medium 
term development finance might be expected to increase. 
4.1.3 Ineffectiveness of the Grain Corporation 
Inception Report, September 1973, stated: 
"The lack of financial resources of the Grain Corporation 
has made it, in many areas, a completely ineffective 
organisation. The Corporation is completely unable to 
perform its proper function of price stabilization, even 
though inter-regional price instability is a major problem." 
(Grain Corporation, 1973) 
It is the general belief of the financial community that a 
more stable price structure i n the cereals market would both increase 
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the demand and the supply of funds for lending. A strengthening of t he 
finance of the Grain Corporation, its gradual transformation into a 
marketing board type organisat ion , and its efficient operation as a 
stabilising influence, might be expected to increase the demand for 
funds . 
4.1.4 The Development of Viable Co-operatives 
Figures are not available of the rejections of loan appli-
cations made by co-operatives to c ommercial banks and to the AID Bank. 
However: 
(i) estimated loan approvals to co-operatives by the 
AID Bank are : $5 million (1973-74; $6 million 
(1974-75); $7 million (1975-56); $7 rr~llion 
(1976-77); $8 million (1977-78) (AID Bank Five 
Year Financial Projections, 1973) . 
(ii) Details of loans granted to co-operatives by the 
AID Bank in three years are shown in Table 4.2. 
The Commercial Bank of Ethiopia has $1.7 million currently outstanding 
to a few co-operatives, primarily in the Jimma coffee growing area 
(AID Bank 1973). 
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TABLE 4.2 
LOANS GRANTED TO CO-OPERATIVES,197l-73 
Period 
1970-71 
1971-72 
1972-73 
Source: 
Number of 
loans 
8 
14 
12 
Total value 
($Em) 
7 .967 
4.081 
3.830 
AIDB, Annual Report, 1973. 
There are two types of farmer co-operatives: registered and 
unregistered. The distinction between them is legal and administrative 
rather than representative of the efficiency of either type. For 
example, some registered co-opera tives are very badly run, while some of 
the unregistered ones are run very efficiently on co-operative principles. 
Out of a total of 26 unregistered co-operatives, only two obtained credit 
faciliti s in 1972. 
Small co-operative farmers and tenants cannot meet the credit 
institutions' requirements for a collateral of tangible security. Group 
lending to farmers and the responsibility for repayment to rest upon the 
group as a whole is not familiar to the credit institutions. Agricultural 
credit institutions give fertilisers and seed inputs, in many cases not 
to the co-operatives but to individual members. For those who can afford 
to pay in cash, there is interest but poorer w£mbers are requested to put 
25 per cent of the value of the loan which they may have to borrow from 
another source and to pay interest at 1 per cent per month. In this 
situation only the richer members obtain a true benefit, the poor ha ving 
to pay more for the same value of inputs. The author does not consider 
this to be a credit policy, more a result of commercial operation by the 
credit institutions. 
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A second important point is that credit for spare parts, tools 
and other improvement inputs is often not available. For heavy equipment 
such as t ractors and trailers, the repayment terms are heavy and the 
period very short. For example, a payment of $Ell,OOO for a tractor has 
to be repaid in two years at 9 per cent per annum. 
There were 40 registered agricultural, multi-purpose co-
operatives as at June 1972, and 27 unregistered co-operatives. The 
Co-operative Development Department estimated that an additional 85 farmers' 
multi-purpose co-operatives would be formed during the year 1972-73 
(Co-operative Development Department Annual Report, 1973). It would 
therefore seem that the majority of registered co-operatives are not 
receiving finance from their institutional sources. The Ministry of 
Community Development report (A.A. 1973) showed that only 18 out of 40 
registered agricultural multi-purpose co-operatives were granting loans 
to members. 
The principal reasons given by financiers for their reluctance 
to finance co-operatives are: 
(i) The identification problem, i.e., financiers are 
unaware in some instances of who is actually 
controlling the day to day decisions of the co-
operatives; 
(ii) The ability problem. This means that the present 
three months training centre at Awassa for training 
co-operative members is considered by financiers to 
be insufficient. 
(iii) The records problem. It appears from interviews 
that financiers are dissatisfied with both the 
quantity and quality of records and accounts 
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maintained by co-operatives. This problem is 
linked with he first two. Improvements in 
management training for co-operative organisers 
with particular emphasis on financial and 
accoID1ting aspects, might be expected to increase 
the effective and satisfied demand for funds by 
co-ope r atives. 
The Availability of Agronomic Research Results 
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The Institute of Agricultural Research (IAR) is confronted by 
two major problems: 
(i) diversity of crop type; and 
(ii) diversity of natural conditions (soils, 
topography, rainfall, etc.) 
Efforts have already been made to conduct fundamental research 
trials but, because of the lack of finance and manpower, as well as 
the constraints listed above , very few results are as yet available for 
extension. 
At the local level, EPID conducts trials via its extension 
agents in each MPP area, to test the results from research stations in 
the local conditions. The agricultural sector survey carried out by 
IBRD (Vol. II, Annex III, January 15, 1973) lists the results which are 
available now for distribution to extension services: 
(i) Improved vari ties of wheat, maize and cotton. 
(ii) Fertilisers suitable for teff, wheat and cotton. 
(iii) Plant density trials for barley, haricot beans and 
co ton. 
(iv) Weed control procedures for maize. 
(v) Disease control for cotton. 
The survey also identifies the results that could be available within 
the next five years as identifying: 
(i) Improved varieties of teff , barley, sorghum and 
haricot beans. 
(ii) Fertilisers suitable for barley, sorghum, maize, 
haricot beans and horse beans. 
(iii) Plant density for wheat, sorghum, haricot beans, 
horse beans, coffee, sesame and chick peas. 
(iv) Weed control procedures for wheat, barley and 
coffee. 
(v) Insect control for coff e. 
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Thus demand for new inputs (and their effect on agricultural output) is 
small now because of a lack of knowledge. The author considers that 
once the priorities for crop development are decided by the Government, 
special emphasis could be placed on research into the selected 
commodities and cash crops. 
4.1.6 The Availability of Inputs 
At present there is no implementation program for improved 
seeds at the national level, and so a large proportion of farmers, even 
in on-going projects, cannot satisfy their requirements for improved 
inputs. However , because of the lack of rural infras ructure and the 
consequent inaccessibility of the majority of farmers, the overall 
present demand for inputs is relatively l ow . The local efforts tha are 
being made to distribute these inputs are outlined below: 
(i) CADU is attempting to supply improved seeds to the 
MPPA from their own development farms. At present 
t hey can sa isfy this specif c demand but do not 
fo resee any great expansion of supply because of 
cost factors and transport constraints. 
(ii) Awassa Farm. Improved ~Bize and other crop 
varieties, developed by the Awassa Experimental 
Research Station are being grown on a fairly 
large scale, and the seeds distributed on a 
regional basis via the Southern Regional 
Development Agency (SORADEP). 
(iii) EPID. A feasibility study has just been carried 
out on the possibilities of providing for seed 
inputs of the Minimum Package Program. This 
would be done at a regional level so that local 
conditions can be incorporated into the results. 
However, despite these experiments, a serious 
supply shortage of inputs under an integrated 
agricultural credit program can be foreseen and 
I consider it most important that a seed program 
is initiated at the national level with provision 
for regional trials. This program is likely in 
its turn, to increase deI~nd for fertilisers. 
In a similar way, small farm equipment, such as carts, 
improved ploughs and harrows are not readily available. The equipment 
-that is available is often not properly adapted for oxen haulage and 
93 
can be expensive in relation to the farmers income. CADU and WADU have 
made considerable advances in adapting farm implements to local requir e-
ments but the results are not distributed on any scale. 
4.2 Indirect Factors 
4.2.1 The Low Literacy Level of Farmers 
The literacy level of the population of Ethiopia is gradually 
increasing . The percentage of the population aged between 7-18 years at 
primary and secondary schools rose by 11 per cent in 1971. Nevertheless, 
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such an increase does not, as yet, have a significant impact on the farm 
population of which approximately 80 per cent is still illiterate and 
very few are actively invo lved with the monetary economy. In this 
situation, it is difficult for any extension service to advise the major 
part of the farm population and to convince them of the need to adopt 
new agricultural techniques, inputs or equipment. 
Also, the idea of credit to improve their farming, monetary 
savings for future employment an d other matters basic to more modern 
farming such as modern measures, weights, yields per crop and per hectare, 
accoill1ting and family budgeting are unfamiliar to individual farmers and 
even to groups of farmers in co-operative societies. 
To improve the literacy level of the majority of farmers, the 
Inter Agency Committee for integrated rural development has proposed a 
new program to make ed,ucation available for people aged 14-40 years. 
This program was due to begin during 1973-74 at the sub-province (Awraja) 
level under the auspices of the Ministry of Education and Fine Arts. 
The pilot program will extend to 16 Awrajas (sub-provinces) and 
in each Awraja will affect 25 villages. Within each village it will 
reach 500 farmers. Village development centres will provide: 
(i) Basic literacy campaign for adults (14-40) years old. 
(ii) A new scholar program for children from 7-15 years, 
oriented towards agriculture. As is quoted in the 
report: 
"At the village level, improved farm management 
practices and introduction of new inputs and 
technology in agricultural field will be 
propagated through the work of trained priests 
and through the school." (Ministry of Education 
Report, 1972). 
It is anticipated that village development centres will reinforce the 
MPP and oth r extension services. 
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4.2 . 2 Rural Development Policy 
At present, as we have seen , there are three main types of 
rural developm nt projects in operation in Ethiopia. They are all l argely 
concerned with increasing agricultural production: 
(i) Minimum Package Program (MPP). 
(ii) Southern Regional Agricultural Development 
Project (SORADEP). 
(iii) Comp r ehensive Projects (CADD, WADD, ADDA, SHOP). 
Also other projects which specialise in animal production 
development or in processing activities exist . All of these many 
projects do not have a very wide coverage and are limited to a small 
geographical area. Each project type is developing its own particular 
methodology in matters of input supply, utilisation and extension 
activities. For example , the MPP practices the utilisation of 
fertilisers at an average application rate from the beginning of its 
ope tion (after one year of observation and a further year of 
demonstration) without giving at this stage any priority to more basic 
agricultural practices. After one or two years, improved seeds may be 
introduced. However, encouraging immediate results have been obtained 
and in the large majority of cases, yields per hectare have been more 
or less doubled. 
SORADEP gives priority to the implementation of npw technical 
practices and to improved seed utilisation. The project defers the use 
of fertilisers until the farmers concerned have attained an adequate 
standard required by the project. Depending on their progress, the use 
of fertiliser begins some two years after the farmers have become 
concerned with the project. As with the MPP, this project also is 
obtaining impressive effects. As a result of this improvement by gradual 
stages, yields have been more or less doubled without any utilisation 
of fertilisers. Where fertilisers have been used, yields have been 
raised to three or four times the traditional level. 
The different programs therefore have their own procedures 
and spheres of influence and their own patterns of credit demand. The 
emphasis given in the future to the different types of programs will 
therefore determine the credit demand arising from these programs. 
4.2 . 3 Lack of Co-ordination between Institutions 
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Apart from communication links at Council of Ministers level, 
Planning Commission and various Inter-ministerial COmmittees, there is 
no permanent system which can effectively co-ordinate the many institutions 
which are directly involved in the implementation of a rural development 
policy. In this respect, included are the Ministries of Finance, 
Agriculture, National ~ommunity Development and Social Affairs and Land 
Reform as well as banks and marketing and input supply organisations. 
This problem is even more acute at the regional level where 
each national body develops its own policies and there i s some evidence 
of overlapping with a consequent waste of resources. 
In order to improve the situation, it will be necessary for 
the co-ordinating methanisms at national, regional and local level to 
be much more clearly defined and vigorous in operation than they are at 
the moment. The particular form of co-ordinating mechanism can only be 
discussed when the detailed structure of the institutional system is 
determined. 
4.2.5 The Lack of }~rketing Organisation for Crops 
The main investment incentive that encourages a farmer to ask 
for agricultural credit is the hope of obtaining a higher income by 
increasing his crop yield per hectare. But unfortunately for the small 
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farmer, prices are unstable and he has a storage facilities which permit 
him to wait until a rise in prices takes place. 
(a) Fluctuation of Prices 
At harvest time, a great many farmers bring their crops to the 
local markets at the same time, hence depressing price levels . Naturally, 
t he smaller farmer badly needs to sell his crop at harvest time in order 
to repay his debts, purchase his household needs and to pay his taxes. 
Cereal prices are highly volatile compar d with those of other 
crops. Thus maize prices at harvest time are very low, i .. $E6-8 per 
quintal at the farm gate and increase by three or four times after a 
few months, perhaps a ttaining $24-26 per quintal. The traders or 
middlemen are the main beneficiaries in this situation. The main reasons 
for this situation are: 
(b) Lack of Competition 
The number of dealers i n the grain markets implies a competitive 
situation vis-a- vis the bidding for grain supplies. However this does not 
necessarily mean that a perfectly competitive price is always reached. 
The same dealers often operate in several markets; the number depending 
on transportation and marketing days. There was clear evidence of monop-
sonistic control in many, many markets (Ministry of Agriculture, 1973). 
Several past studies have concluded that the existence of six, seven or 
more dealers in a given Ethiopian grain market guara teed a competitive 
situation (Ministry of Agriculture, 1973). In most cases, if not all, 
six or up to a dozen buyers were likely to enter into some agreement as 
to the prices they would pay. This also seems to have been the case for 
other agricultural products. 
On the selling side of the market, conditions and practices 
approached pure competition. Dealers generally determined the price they 
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would pay for grain by learning the wholesale buying price in the terminal 
or central markets and working backwards, calculating the price they were 
willing to pay after accounting for their respective mark-up targets. 
It is m st important to remember that alZ grain markets in Ethiopia are 
" thin" and a relatively small increase in the supply of grain of f ered 
will result in substantial reductions in price. Not even the Addis-Ababa 
grain market will absorb increased supplies without a sharp price reaction. 
This is a vital factor to consider in all future project development. In 
fact, rumour of supply changes have resulted in serious short-run price 
movements. 
( c) Weighing and Gr ading Standards 
In those markets that were accessible by road, balance scales 
were used. A small percentage of the scales had been inspected by one 
authority or another. Even so, inspection did not ensure honest weighing 
and was not of real value. It was not unusual to find scales that under-
or over-weighed by ten per cent or so and, of course, always in favour of 
the operator. In those areas not accessible by road, sales were based on 
volume measurement (i e., locally known as the cuna, the tassa, etc.). 
Grading was generally determined by the colour and the amount of 
admixture in the grain. Origin was also a consideration especially in the 
case of teff. The dealers used the trading issue to reduce the price, 
therefore grading was often the subject of long and strenuous arguments. 
The Ethiopian Standards Institution has been established to correct the 
problems in this regard but it will be a long and difficult job for set 
s t andards have not, to date, been legalised . 
(d) Poor Storage Faciliti s 
Small farmers rarely have good storage facilities. Consequently, 
they either lose because of low prices if they s e ll all their produce at 
harves time or they los a part of their crops (perhaps, on average, 
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20 per cent) because of poor storage. Table 4.3 shows households 
reporting loss in storage refer to rats and mice as the main reason for 
loss, with insects and humidity as secondary reasons. Thus, in the 
individual tenure province of Keffa, We11ega and I11ubabor, more than 
70 per cent of farming households report a loss of stored crops caused 
by rats and mice. The communal provinces are situated on the highlands 
and have naturally favourable storage conditions, i.e., a cool and dry 
(most of the year) climate. 
Depending on the construction and condition of the storage 
facility in the highland (communal) markets, storage losses generally 
ranged from one to two per cent per month. Rodents did the most damage 
followed by moisture spoilage and insects. At lower elevations, storage 
losses generally ranged from two to four per cent per month and in 
exceptional cases, much higher. At the lower elevations, insects and 
mould were the leading causes of loss, doing more damage than even the 
rodents . Low producer prices relative to those charged to consumers in 
the metropolitan areas are therefore mainly due to: 
(i) The lack of marketing laternatives under competitive 
conditions, and great distance between markets, 
considering the modes of transportation. 
(ii) Excessive price variations between places at 
different distances from the main transportation 
facilities. Unduly high farm-to-market trans-
portation costs prevent the farmer from getting 
as high a price as those who are closer to the 
market. 
(iii) Lack of credit both short- and long-term, to 
finance inputs, inventories, etc. This forces 
arm rs to sell immediately after harvest, when 
prices are lowest. 
Province 
1. Tigre 
2. I11ubabor 
3. Sidamo 
4. Keffa 
5. Shoa 
6. Gojjam 
7 . Hararghe 
8. Begemdir 
9 . Arussi 
10. Gemu Goffa 
11. Bale 
12. Wallo 
13. We11ega 
TABLE 4.3 
PERCENTAGE DISTRIBUTION OF FARMING HOUSEHOLDS REPORTING LOSS IN 
STORAGE BY CAUSE OF LOSS 
No. of Percentage of Farming Households Report ing as Cause Farming 
House- No loss Rats & Insects Damp Other Not holds Mice Stored 
240246 56.32 35.19 3.96 0.71 0 . 08 0.96 
135950 9.06 70.26 2.32 0.15 0.05 16.41 
291600 23.39 29 . 22 8 . 37 0.65 0 . 03 32.89 
241445 7.96 73.75 1.82 0.17 0.25 12.96 
461255 56.1 31.32 7.02 0.84 0.07 2.91 
254275 42.51 37.32 13.45 1.98 0.12 O. 79 
247730 39.68 6.20 35.77 7.72 7.72 3.13 
271290 47.98 38.26 10884 0.22 0.18 0.11 
121900 9.84 1.15 12.63 17.06 5.58 0.33 
121985 19.43 56.80 3.77 2.38 0.16 14.84 
70220 32.33 49.16 12.41 2.12 
292745 47.92 33 .79 4.99 2.23 0.94 3.43 
297300 4.26 81.27 8.53 0.61 0.13 3.23 
Not 
Stated 
3 .79 
1.72 
5.45 
3.09 
1.74 
3.84 
7.44 
2.40 
8.12 
2.62 
3.98 
7.57 
1.9 
~ 
0 
0 
(iv) Excessive speculation and hoarding by dealers 
with resulting high prices at the consumer 
level. 
(v) Excessive storage losses, and 
(vi) The weak bargaining power of the traditional 
farmer vis-a-vis the grain dealer. 
(Ministry of Agriculture, 1973). 
4.2.5 The Lack of Marketing Organisation for Livestock Products 
Ethiopia owns more cattle than any other African country and 
livestock activities constitute an important element in its economy. 
At the beginning of 1973, livestock was estimated by the 
Central Statistical Office at 26 million cattle (of which 6-7 million 
were draft oxen), 23 million sheep and goats, 7 million horses, mules, 
donkeys and camels, 48 million poultry and 18,000 pigs (CSO, 1972). 
Some types of cattle are of good quality and specialised for 
meat production and are called Borana; sheep reared in the eastern 
lowlands are imported by Middle Eastern countries and skins of sheep 
reared in highlands are exported to Europe. 
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Unfortunately, the livestock is not ffic iently managed and 
the offtake of cattle is quite poor; it may be around 10 per cent 
(from 3-6 per cent for commercial slaughters, 2 per cent for draft 
purposes, 2-5 per cent for domestic consumption). In fact, no accurate 
assessment exists and the rates mentioned above are based on data 
relating to yearly provided hides. 
The figures could be somewhat higher if it were possible to 
take into account unknown sales to Somaliland and Kenya. The offtake of 
sheep and goats is much better and can reach 60 per cent. Fresh milk 
and milk products are mostly used for on-farm consumption. However, 
102 
milk marketing activities do exist in the urban areas, and some 
redistribution takes place. The Dairy Development Agency was created in 
1971 and is in charge of all milk marketing activities. 
The Agency now has 32 dairy collecting centres and has promoted 
four milk co-operatives . Links also exist with CADU and MPP. The 
Agency collects and processes about 10,000 litres of milk per day. These 
marketing activities will be strengthened in the near future with the 
implementation of the Addis Ababa Da iry Development Project financed by 
IDA. 
The Livestock and Meat Board was created in 1964 to improve 
livestock and livestock products marketing activities. So far the Board 
has not taken a direct part in marketing activities, although it has done 
so indirectly through the Malgue Wondo Slaughterhouse and the Ethiopian 
Meat Concentrate Compapy, in which it had equity participation. 
However, marketing activities will depend mostly on traders, 
although there are three private plants (SOPHRAC, INCODE and a Japanese 
group). Generally, the marketin g arrangements are poor; the problems 
include those of animals having to be moved on the hoof and thereby losing 
live weight, sometimes up to 50 kg per head. 
A considerable impact on t he marketing structures and activities 
relating to livestock can be expected as a result of the second Livestock 
Development Project financed by the World Bank. It might be possible to 
develop credit facilities for individuals or groups concerned with 
fattening activities and for breeders contracting with slaughterhouses and 
processing units. 
4.2.6 Limited Extension Services 
There are several agencies which develop and train agricultural 
experts: 
(i) A1emaya College and the agricultural institutes 
of Jimma and Ambo between them produced 93 
graduates and 104 extension agents in 1972-73. 
(ii) Awassa Co-operative Training Centre produced 
about 30 co-operative agents per three months 
in 1972-73. 
(iii) CADD produced 31 assistant extension agents in 
1972-73, 23 of whom were made available to EPID. 
EPID also obtained 28 of the 58 marketing agents 
trained by CADD. 
103 
The flow of technical manpower resources is therefore limited, 
compared with the size of the problem . The implementation of any 
integrated agricultural credit policy would place very considerable 
emphas is on extension and co-operative services and a limited supply of 
experts in these activities could act as a major constraint to the 
implementation of a credit system and also to co-operative formation 
and the expansion of MPP. The MPP is expected to grow at about 10 areas 
per year and this would require an annual intake of 50 extension agents 
and 50 marketing and assistant marketing agents. The creation of many 
co-operatives is also planned. 
Some contribution towards remedying the situation may be made 
via the proposed IDA loan which is to finance three sixth-form training 
centres in 1973-74 and three more in 1974-75. They are expected, when 
complete, to turn out a total of about 240 assistant extension agents per 
year. 
Thus, it is expected that the problem of acute manpower shortage 
in exten ion services will be reduced by the end of 1975, but it is likely 
that similar efforts will have to be made to increase the number of co-
operative agents. 
4 . 3 Small Farmers inside MPP Areas 
4.3.1 Lending Policy 
Among factors affecting the demand for credit by individual 
small farmers in MPP areas, the following are important: 
(a) Downpayment 
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It is normal for farmers to contribute in cash for a fraction 
of the cost of inputs they use. This is generally 25 per cent and some 
farmers are unable to meet the required downpayment requirements particu-
larly at the early stage of their incorporation into the programs. It 
could be suggested that it is necessary to modify this downpayment 
according to their security in the project. The downpayment was not 
required by WADD project in the past and was limited to 8 per cent of the 
cost in SORADEP. 
(b) Date of Repayment 
In the absence of stabilised prices and of extensive storage 
facilities, the fixing of prices results from the system of supply and 
demand. At harvest time, a large quantity of crops is brought to market 
and prices tend to fall. We have observed that the price for maize ha s 
been $E7 per quintal at the harvest time and $E22-2S per quintal after 
some months. There have been similar significant differences for other 
crops. Unfortunately, loans are often provided on a short term basis 
and repayment is over eight months. Small farmers are obliged to sell a 
part of their crop to repay in due time and this coincides in many cases 
with the harvest time. It represents a loss for farmers until the most 
important marketing services are linked with the ~~P credit system. 
(c) Absence of Pre-harvest Loans 
Sometimes farmers are in need of cash in order to buy goods for 
consumption just before harvest time. WADU gives a loan of $E15 per 
farmer to meet ceremonial expenses . Repayment rate has been virtually one 
hundred per cent. 
Cd) Ratio of Extension Agents/Number of Farmers - Receptivity of 
Farm rs vis-a-vis Innovation s 
It has been reported by the MPP that the nat ral receptivity 
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of farmers vis-a-vis innovations is high. The data collected from the 
oldest MPP areas, i.e., those existing from 1971, shmvs that except in 
Keffa and in Shewa provinces, the effective incorporation of small farme rs 
into schemes has not exceeded 10 to 15 per cent. This could partially be 
a result of the existing ratio of extention agents to number of farmers. 
T1:-ere is currently one extension agent and an assistant for around 2,000 
farmers. 
In comparison, SORADEP has reached 6,000 farmers after two years 
and 13 , 000 farmers after three years. There is an effective incorporation 
of 50 per cent and 75 per cent respectively. We observe that in SORADEP, 
one assistant extension agent has been responsible for 35-50 farmers in 
the first year, around 100 farmers in the second year and 150 farmers in 
the third year. It would seem that smaller ratios of extension agents 
to farmers have corresponding effects on the demand for credit. 
Ce) Inadequacy and Prices of Inputs 
The MPP is operating on a national basis and promoting more or 
less standard innovat ions throughout the country. 
As a result of the various natural conditions prevailing in 
Ethiopia, it is ob ious that in some areas inputs are not as well adapted 
and used as they should be. There is a complaint about prices of inputs 
as well as for improved seeds and fertilisers being high. In some 
developing countries improved seeds are subsidised and exchanges against 
traditional seeds with a very small difference in weight. The weight 
difference generally does not exceed 25 per cent and may be applied in 
Ethiopia in the future. 
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As far as fertiliser is concerned, world market prices are 
increasing from year to year, and transport costs are becoming a greater 
burden. To encourage farmers to use fertilisers, the lowest possible 
price must be charged. Long term use of subsidy can be discouraged 
because, if for one reason or another, one is obliged to return to the 
full cost price, there is sometimes a disincentive effect on farmers. 
Finally, it can be noted that the demand for some implements 
may be inhibited by their unsuitability to local conditions. This is 
especially true in the case of improved ploughs. The needed pull-off 
exceeds the local draught oxen capacity and specially selected draught 
oxen are needed. 
(f) Credit and the Repayment Capacity of a Farm 
The repayn~nt capacity of a farm determines whether or not a 
credit can be given. The majority of household farms (62 per cent) have 
an area of less than a hectare. However, the cropping pattern determines 
if the farm is viable. Thus, for a farm household of 0 6 hectares, a 
repayment capacity will tend to be possible if the cropping pattern 
includes an industrial crop such as coffee, tobacco, etc. On the other 
hand, if the cropping pattern depends mainly on cereals, the farmer may 
not have the capacity for repayment, particularly if he is a tenant. 
4.4 Small Farmers Inside Comprehensive Projects (CADU, WADU, ADDA, SORADEP) 
It can be observed that in comprehensive projects, lending 
conditions are less restrictive than in MPP programs and conditions 
depend on the project itself. 
For example, no downpayment has been required for fertiliser by 
WADU and 8 per cent has been required by SORADEP, compared with 25 per 
cent by CADU and MPP . The CADU requirement was geared according to the 
size of the farm. In these conditions, downpayment requirement could 
reach 50 per cent for farms exceeding 6 hectares (fertilisers) and 
5 hectares (seeds). 
On the other hand, CADU sells small implements and selected 
cattle on a medium term credit basis of two years and five years 
respectively. 
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MPP is granting loans to small farmers of less than 20 hectares 
whatever the tenancy, so is CADU after its initial practice of 30 hectares. 
In CADU and WADU small farmers are also benefiting from the 
provision of marketing facilities. SORADEP expects very soon to offer 
marketing facilities of relevance to farmers growing maize. Storage 
facilities will be built at the Awassa Farm, and these will act as a 
regional deve lopment focus. 
4.5 Security Requirement in MPP and Comprehensive Package Projects 
Each farmer applying for credit is expected to have two 
guarantors who will sign the application. The extension agents check 
whether the farmer has · settled his debt from the previous season. If 
the applicant is a tenant or a landlord, he is expected to produce a 
written tenancy agreement acceptable to the project or to sign one of 
the four model lease agreements prepared by the project. The leases 
define and formalise the relationship between the landlord and the 
tenant. This is, of course, due to the absence of any land tenancy 
legislation in Ethiopia. 
A landlord who is not willing to have written agreement s with 
his tenants is excluded from the credit scheme. The application is then 
presented to the model farmer area committee for app roval, amendment or 
rejection. The committee is expected to check that: 
(a) the size of cultivated land indicated in the 
c r edit application is correct; 
(b) the applicant is creditworthy, and 
(c) his guarantors are acceptable (CADU Credit 
Program 1972, and EPID, Ministry of 
Agriculture, 1972). 
4.6 Small Farmers Outside MPP and Comp rehensive Package Projects 
Individual small farmers outside the scope of MPP and 
Comprehensive Projects find it nearly impossible to obtain credit. 
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Only small tobacco growers can receive seeds and pesticides. These are 
provided free by the Tobacco Monopoly and no other loan facilities are 
available. 
A possible solution to the problem of these small farmers would 
be for them to develop credit co-operatives. However, they find it 
difficult to overcome the constraint of inaccessibility. 
With respect to the inaccessible farmers, only collectors are 
reaching them at harvest time. These farmers account for more than 70 per 
cent of the four million existing farm households. 
In the next chapter the credit needs of the communal tenure 
provinces shall be analysed, taking int o account the tenurial problems 
already discussed in Chapter 2. 
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CHAPTER 5 
COMMUNAL TENURE PROVINCES 
In the first of three sections, a cause is advanced for small-
scale farming. Governmental involvement in the process of agricultural 
development often tends to favour large production units: these having 
better access to improved technology, to credit and to markets. 
The advocacy of small scale farming is because of its merits 
with regard to maximising employment; its higher productivity per unit 
of land, and its positive effects upon reducing foreign capital input 
dependence. Fisk's model of the relationship between labour and 
productivity is then discussed to outline the situation in the Ethiopian 
communal tenure provinces. The final section central to the argument 
introduces a "group loan" scheme as a means whereby credit can be 
channelled to the small farmers. 
5.1 The Merits of Small Scale Farming 
There is a great deal of evidence from the developing world as 
a whole to indicate that, given a gestation period of several years, 
an agricultural development strategy oriented toward involving the 
peasant farmer in a technological revolution is more likely to produce the 
required surpluses, at less cost in terms of the scarce resources, i.e., 
capital land and foreign exchange, than an alternative strategy which 
concentrates on mechanised large units. 
In a study made by P. Dorner of an area in India (Madhya Pradesh), 
in the United States (Illinois) and in Chile (Central Valley) some inter-
esting relationships are revealed. For example, in the area in India, 
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despite the fact that average farms are not very large, the large farms 
had ten times as much land per man as the small farms. In Chile, the 
large farms had fifteen times as much land per man as the small farms. 
In Illinois, the large farms had three times as much land per man as the 
small farms. Of course, the absolute acreage per man was much larger in 
Illinois for both small and large farms than in India and Chile 
(Peter Dorner, 1971). 
What the above figures reveal is the wider range of technology 
in use in countries such as India and Chile versus that in the United 
States, especially technology of a l abour-saving type. It would appear 
from these relationships that the technolo gy used in the United States is 
much more uniform between large and small farms. 
Peter Dorner points out further that even in Taiwan, with its 
extremely small units, farms of less than half a hectare employed 387 
units of labour per crop hectare while farms greater than 2 hectares in 
size employed only 146 units of labour per crop hectare. The importance 
of such labour-intensive production methods lies in the fact that it is 
less costly than large-scale capital-intensive production in terms of 
the goods that are scarce in a developing economy. There is n o doubt 
that the owners of large private farms may obtain a good income by using 
more machines and less labour, but they render a less useful service to 
the struggling developing economy of a low-income, capital-scarce country. 
The Ethiopian small farmer and his family prepare the land, plant, 
weed and harvest the crop by hand or at best with the help of an oxen or 
two; while the large farm combines hired labour with machinery to cultivate 
an area that may be several hundred times as large per worker. This 
comparison highlights the importance of a smallholder tenure system from 
the viewpoint of Ethiopia's employment objectives. 
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According to the Land Tenure Centre of the University of 
Wisconsin, evidence it has collected in regard to Brazil, Colombia, 
Guatemala, India, Japan, Mexico, The Philippines and Taiwan shows that 
production per unit of land is almost always higher on small farms than 
on large farms. Data collected by the same organisation concerning land 
reform in Bolivia, Chile, Egypt, Japan, Mexico, Taiwan and Yugoslavia, 
in all of which the reform caused a reduction in average farm size, show 
that although in some cases there was an initial drop, average 
productivity per unit of land increased rather substantially after these 
reforms (Dorner, 1970). 
Kenya provides direct evidence of the comparative productivity 
of large-scale mechanised farming and smallholder enterprise on the same 
land after its expropriation and subdivision for settlement of landless 
peasants. A joint Kenya-United Kingdom mission has estimated that 
smallholder settlement will have increased production in 1970-71 by 
30 p r cent over the level achieved on the same farms when operated by 
Europeans as large-scale units (Government of Kenya, unpublished data, 
1970). Achievement of this increase has, of course, required a sub-
stantial Kenya Government investment in capital and technical assistance 
to the settlers, but it suggests that if the Government can provide them 
with access to the modern inputs which large-scale farmers are able to 
buy with their own capital, smallholders tend to farm a given land area 
more intensively. Settlement brought more and better roads, additional 
water supplies and fencing. 
Finally, attention needs to be drawn to a change in farm inputs. 
Settlement has brought a much higher input of labour but a low input of 
in~ort d c pital g ds (i. .• a repluc m nt by labour of impor ed types 
of capital) . A final factor of importance is thus the reduction of the 
foreign exchange component within farming expenses. On large farms, 
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roughly 25-35 per cent of the total farm expenses is taken up by goods 
which have to be imported, while the foreign exchange percentage in 
settlement is but 14-18 per cent (R. Ruthenberg, 1966). Settlement areas 
consume few imported goods other than fertil ser, sprays, medicines and 
some contractor ploughs and combines. Besides, the settlements' marketing 
co-operatives have been provided the same links with nationwide marketing 
organisations that European farmers had. 
It should be noted that this comparison does not mean that the 
Ethiopian Government should not s upport individual large scale farming 
enterprises when the availability of foreign or local private capital, or 
the characteristics of particular crops and development areas, ensure a 
high social return to specific investments of public resources. But the 
corner stone of Ethiopia's development policy for arable agriculture should 
be the modernisation of smallholder enterprise through various types of 
"package" programs and the thrust of national land policy reform which 
will be to make the country's land tenure system reinforce this effort. 
5.2 The Communal Areas: Labour and Productivity 
Now turn to the specific problem of the communal areas. 
Population pressure and the land tenure system were discussed in Chapter 2. 
In the same chapter, the degree of agricultural specialisation and market 
dependence were identified as subsistence with supplementary cash production. 
Now an attempt will be made to analyse the situation in more detail with 
the help of Fisk's model (Fisk, 1962), and thus to suggest the way credit 
should be channelled through choosing the right technology. 
Reference is made to all regions of communal tenure. We shal l 
assume initially land, technology and capital to be constant and that 
only population varies. The production possibilities with varying i nputs 
of labour are shown by the curve O-T in Figure 5.1. 
FIGURE 5.1 
LABOUR ABSORPTION CAPACITY OF THE 
COMMUNAL TENURE PROVINCES 
/ 
S2 ~,----------------------------~~~~~ 
Sl 
S ~I - - - - --.1 
D 
G 
o L 
/ 
/ 
LABOUR 
113 
114 
The social and demographic characteristics of the population are taken as 
given and are a direct function of the population N. The intersection of 
the perpendicular from L with curve O-T ndicates the amount of subsistence-
type produce that can be produced by this unit when it applies the full 
potential supply of labour to the land available. For details of the model 
see Fisk, 1962 or 1971 where, as in this chapter, the application of the 
model is confined to the communal areas. 
Fisk points out that the surplus labour available for invest-
ment at any given level of population is determined by the relative 
position of the radial Op' and the production curve O-T. So also is the 
amount of surplus agricultural produce of this type that this labour 
could produce once linkage is established (Fisk, 1962). We are interested 
in point G; as G is a physiologically determined level of consumption, 
below which the nutrition of the population would be inadequate to 
sustain the potential supply of labour at L. The communal areas are in 
a position G2 , where population pressure on the land is quite advanced 
and both the surplus labour available for investment and the potential for 
increased agricultural production have virtually disappeared. 
Hence, in such a situation, any prospect of raising the evel of 
income of the communal areas would appear to depend on the availability 
of external capital resources to improve the productive capacity of the 
land or by resettling some of the population on government lands. 
There is evidence that the population pressure in the communal 
areas has forced farmers to migrate from their homes in search of land. 
Often they migrate to areas where there is unused privately-owned land, 
which they may occupy as tenants or as illegal "squa tters" , but in many 
instances they move on to unoccupied government land. The disorderly 
occupation of government land continues through sporadic and uncontrolled 
migration which is commonly described in the discussion of Ethiopian land 
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affairs as "spontaneous settlement". MacArthur (Harvard Advisory Group 
consultant) suggests that accommodation settlement should be introduced. 
By "accoIImlodation settlement" he means those situations where government 
land is to be used for the planned allocation of rela tively small holdings 
to individuals who will receive the minimal level of government-provided 
services, both before and during the stages of entry to the land, and 
during the subsequent years of occupation (MacArthur, 1973). 
5.3 Cr dit to Small Farmers 
The question of how best to provide credit facilities to small 
farmers is inextricably associated with innovation choices. Should these 
be land saving or labour saving? 
Labour saving devices will have no effect on the level of output 
at which the marginal productivity of labour approaches zero. But a land 
sav'ng device such as ~he introduction of fertiliser, impro ed .seeds, 
irrigation schemes, land improvement and conservation schemes, have the 
effect of raising the overall productivity of the land, so that the 
marginal productivity of labour approaches zero at a higher level of 
total production. This is the situation represented in Figure 5.2 by the 
change in the production curve from OT I to OT 3 . 
This type of innovation is technically possible in Ethiopia, 
but it requires capital investment and, as we have seen, population 
pressure in most of the communal tenure regions has reached the stage 
(G2 in Figure 5.1) where all labour and all production is required for 
survival. This means that saving as a means of capital formation is 
virtually impossible. Under these circumstances, credit (or a grant) is 
the only practicable source of the capital necessary to raise produc-
tivity and break through the confining bonds of poverty. 
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5 . 4 Group Loans to Small Farmers 
The term "group" covers both formally established groups such 
as co-operatives or farmers' associations and informal groups which have 
come together specifically for the purpose of obtaining credit. Group 
lending is an interim measure, leading to the formation of co-operatives. 
So far in Ethiopia, credit has been provided to legally constituted 
co-operatives through the package projects and has excluded farmers out-
side the project area. Since the credit is for production purposes, 
responsibility for obtaining the loan, for disbursement and for repayment, 
can be vested either in an individual (as a group leader) or in a 
committee. The success of this system seems to depend on a thorough 
understanding of the social s t ructure and the fact that social pressures 
on individuals may weaken over time. 
5 . 5 The Advantages of Group Loans 
(a) The banks demand for land as mortgage can be avoided since 
the responsibility of repayment rests upon the group. This means that 
the choice of the individual borrower is not a decision which the bank or 
lending agency has to make, but rather it is one that can be left to a 
group of farmers who are in a very good position to judge the credit-
worthiness of their peers. 
(b) Administrative cost is reduced owing to the fact that the 
bank deals with one person (group leader) or one committee rather than a 
large number of individual borrowers. 
(c) Since credit must be linked with extension and marketing in 
order to avoid unproductive indebtedn ss, to ensure that techn ical 
improvements are available at the right time and place and that increased 
income is realised, the problem of the shortage of the extension services 
can be minimised through farming groups. In other words, he available 
staff can concentrate their educational efforts through farming groups 
instead of fragmenting their efforts to a large number of individual 
farmers. 
5.6 Conditions for Success of Group Loans 
Group loans should be an effective method of providing small 
farmers with the necessary capital to adopt proven agricultural tech-
niques, leading to increased economic return, provided that: 
(a) they have adequate access to these profitable 
techniques, and are educated in their use; 
(b) the increase in production brings a corresponding 
increase in the farmers' net income by offering a 
remunerative price; 
(c) the disbursement of credit at all levels is not 
conditional upon factors unrelated to agricultural 
production; 
(d) enterprises for which credit is granted are 
economically viable, so as to ensure returns 
permitting repayment of the loan and also profit 
to the farmer (Seminar on Agricultural Credit for 
Small Farmers, 1973). 
In a situation where administrative resources are limited, 
credit operations should be concentrated on specific crops rather than 
specific areas. For example, in the communal provinces most of the 
crops grown are homogeneous and therefore research and demonstration 
trials have to focus on these crops. 
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5 . 7 The Question of Subsidy and What should be Subsidised 
The term "subsidy" means a transfer of resource to the farmer 
for which he is not required to pay. Government resources available for 
providing subsidies to agriculture are very limited and, of necess i ry, 
their allocation of this use means that some other government activity 
is deprived of funds. Husbandry standards, within the confines of the 
prevailing unsophisticated technology , are remarkably high in the communal 
areas, but the introduction of technology-based innovations has yet to 
begin. Subsidies can be powerful economic levers if used widely. There 
is evidence that in many credit programs the interest rate charged should 
be of the order of 25 to 30 per cent, if all the costs involved (cost of 
c pit], administration, 10 BCS duc to d fault) are to b cove r ed. But 
interest rates in small farmer credit programs are very much lower than 
this. This creates a dangerous situation, where it is likely that cheap 
farm credit will be siphoned off into investments which have lit t le to 
do with developing the small farner (Small Farmers Agricultura l Semina r 
in Africa, 1973). 
Government-sponsored agricultural credit programs generally 
have to operate at a loss with administrative costs exceeding incomes 
from the low interest rates and modest service payments charged to small 
farmers. The justification for subsidising operating costs are: 
(a) small farmers need the incentive of low-cost 
credit to adopt new technologies; 
(b) if interest rates were to cover their costs, 
then they would discourage farmers from 
borrowing; 
(c) small farmers need supervision to guarantee that 
they use the new production resources wisely. 
The costs of such supervision, however, are 
too high as a rule to be covered by interest 
and service charges on loans and must, 
therefore, be absorbed by the Government as 
transfers to the credit institution. 
Cd) The costs of communicating new technology and 
of absorbing the risks involved in their 
adoption could not be borne totally by the 
small farmer himself. 
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For all these reasons, subsidy is justifiable, but the question 
is: For how long would such a subs idy last? Subsidy could not be 
indefinite and is meant to acquaint the farmers with the new inputs for 
a maximum period of about three to four years prior to their becoming 
self-reliant. To raise productivity needs research, demonstration and 
extension. When government resources are directed towards the 
identification of profitable technologies, to the organisation of 
extension, marketing and extension services and the provision of infra-
structure such as roads, irrigation schemes and storage facilities, then 
the subsidy effect on the farmer and his attitude towards farm production 
can be positive . 
The next chapter will attempt to analyse the credit needs of 
the individual tenure provinces, taking into consideration the tenurial 
problems discussed in Chapter 2. 
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CHAPTER 6 
INDIVIDUAL TENURE PROVINCES 
It was suggested in Chapter 2 that the different types of 
tenure in which farmers work influence their productivity. The issues 
and problems of tenancy would become clearer if we distinguished between 
the dimension of opportunity in farming and the status or degrees of 
freedom of the individual. This chapter, therefore, deals with the 
tenancy problems of the individual tenure provinces. Fisk's Model will 
be used to analyse the inc ntive for increased work and investment 
under different tenancy conditions. Incentive in this chapte r refers 
to monetary incentive and the farmer is assumed to respond to prospects 
of economic gain. Finally, the uses of credit and forms in which it is 
provided will be examined. 
6.1 Tenancy 
6.1.1 Tenant with 50/50 Share Basis 
The 50/50 sharing arrangement is the basis of tenancy in many 
parts of Ethiopia. In those provinces, population pressure on land 
resources is moderate. This is illustrated in Figure 6 .1. We shall also 
assume here initially that land, technology and capital are held constant. 
The social and demographic characteristics of the farm population are 
taken as given in the short run and the potentially available supply of 
labour on the farm is a direct func tion of the farm population. The 
intersection of the perpendicular from L '''ith the curve O-T indicates 
a 
the amount of subsistence-type product that could be produced by this 
unit if it applied the full potential supply of labour to the land 
available . 
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Fisk specifies that G is a physiologically determined level of 
consumption below which the nutrition of the farm population would be 
inadequate to sustain the potential supply of labour at Lp . In Figure 
6 . 1 , this level could jus t be sustained f or an owner operator by the 
application of the minimum input of labour ML necessary to maint ain the 
population at its working strength . However, if the farmer is a tenant 
on a 50/50 share basis he has to use more than twice this amount of labour 
~ to increase the product from G to 2G, so that the landlord can take 
half of the product and still leave him with his minimum subsistence 
requirement. 
Even if he produces a surplus above 2G using his full potential 
supply of labour L, as in theory he can to S, that extra product has also 
to be shared equally with his landlord . Hence, t he tenant has little 
motivation to produce more than just enough to provide him with his 
minimum subsistence. 
Let us now postulate a land imp r oving investment (e.g., in the 
purchase of fertiliser) that can raise the production possibility curve 
from O-Ta to O-Tb at an investment cos t, borne by the t enant of S'SXX ' , 
as shown in Figure 6.1. This will increase the production attainable, 
at any level of labour input, by the vertical distance between the two 
curves , and under the 50/50 arrangement, half of this gain S'SRR' will 
go to the tenant. But from his half of the increase, the tenant has to 
meet the cost of the investment S ' SXX' leaving him only a very small 
part of the net gain X'XRR' the majority of which goes t o the landlord. 
This is shown in Figure 6.1 for the maximum level of labour input Lp. 
At low r l evels of labour input, the total gain from the investment 
would be less, and the half accruing to the tenant would be smaller, 
but as t he cos t of the investment remains the same , the net gain to the 
tenant from the investment would be even smaller, The effect of the 
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50/50 sharing basis of tenancy is therefore to reduce very greatly the 
incentive to a tenant to undertake any land improving investment at all. 
Credit for such purposes is thus less likely to be of significant benefit. 
For this reason, land reform, or at least some modification in the tenancy 
arrangements is a necessary prerequisite for the effective institution of 
rural credit as a means of raising production in these provinces. 
Let us look at some of these alternatives and assess their 
effects on productivity and on the usefulness of credit as an aid to 
investment. 
6.1.2 Owner Operator 
Land reform would eventually change the status of the tenant to 
that of owner operator. 
As shown in Figure 6.2, beyond his minimum input of labour ~ 
(necessary to sustain the farm population at its working strength) for 
example, to Ll , his incentive for additional work is very much higher as 
when he raises his production to Sl' the increase all goes to him, 
whereas under the 50/50 arrangement he would have received none. 
Similarly, at the higher labour input Lp he produces to S, and all this, 
instead of merely half, would go to him. Hence, his incentive for 
additional work is very much higher than where he must share additional 
output with the landlord . But his additional labour input Ll or Lp does 
not give him a proportional increase in produce as the law of diminishing 
returns applies as shown by the proportion of SIN to NS. 
The incentive to invest is more than twice as high on the 50/50 
basis at any l evel of labour input as we saw from Figure 6.1. Since his 
investment cost is the same at Ll and Lp ' his incentive at the higher level 
of labour input is higher than at the lower level of labour input. 
Credit for investment purposes is therefore of much more significance to 
an owher operator than to a tenant operating on a 50/50 agreement. 
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It should be r emembe re d that the incentive for investment to 
increase production does not depend on the availability of credit alone 
but on a host of other external factors such as transport facilities, 
marketing, etc. In other words, it is necessary to establish an 
effective and economic linkage with the exchange economy as an incentive 
to produce more. 
To turn the tenant into an owner operator requires land reform 
and this is not easy to achieve. The complexities and political nature 
of the process have been well stated by Galbraith (1951): 
"Unfortunately, some of our current discussions of 
land reform in the underdeveloped countries proceeds 
as though this reform were something that a government 
proclaims on any fine morning, that it gives land to 
the tenants as it might give pensions to old soldiers 
or as it might reform the administration of justice. 
In fact, land reform i s a revolutionary step; it passes 
power, property and status from one group in the 
c ommunity to , another. If the Government of the country 
is dominated or strongly influenced by the landholding 
groups - the one that would lose its prerogatives -
no one should expect effective land legislation as an 
act of grace." (pp.695-6 . 
It is not therefore surprising that Ethiopia's land reform Bills are 
constantly rejected by landlord parliamentarians. This does not mean 
that the proposals are not sound, but merely that they lack political 
support. The existence of strong peasant organisations to protect the 
interests of t enants against the greater power of landlords will not 
also be realised for some time to come in Ethiopia. 
Though land reform gives the best answer, it may be difficult 
and slou. The refo re, I will consider some alternatives, at least as an 
interim measure . 
6.1.3 Tenant with Rent Fixed at Base Year Level (50% of 2G) 
A great deal can be achieved simply by legislating to outlaw 
rent agreements on a share basis, and substituting a fixed rent. Even 
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if the rent is fixed at a base year level, i.e., 50 per cent of 2G, the 
situation can change considerably in favour of the tenant. When this 
is done, the product of any extra labour input beyond ~ accrues to the 
tenant and is not shared with the landlord. The incentive to do additional 
work is therefore doubled because the whole of the surplus so produced goes 
to the operator instead of half . 
The effect on the incentive to invest in productive land 
improvements is even more dramatic as shown in Figure 6.3. The gain from 
the investment at any level of labour input is still the vertical distance 
b tween the curves O-Ta and O-Tb . If this gain in product is called X'XTT' 
and the cost of the improvement S'SXX', then the gain to the operator is 
X' XTT'-S'SXX ', whereas under the 50/50 basis, it would have been X'XTT'-
S'SXX' which would be substantially less than half (X'XTT'-S'SXX'). 
6.1.4 Tenant with Fixed Rent Reduced to Two-Thirds of Base Year 
When the fixed rent is reduced to one-third as shown in Figure 6.4, 
all advantages already indicated for a fixed rent remain operative. The 
only differences from the case outlined in section 6.1.3 above, are: 
(a) The minimum amount of labour input required to 
meet the tenant's minimum subsistence and the 
rent is reduced from MT to ~,. 
(b) The surplus produce that the tenant can produce 
and retain is increased by U'U2G2G' so that: 
(c) The return to the tenant for any input of labour 
above ~, is increased by U'USS'. 
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It will be noted that the incentive to invest is the same as in 
section 6 . 1.3 , and is unaffected by the reduction in rent at all levels 
of labour input above MT. Below ~ there s some advantage in returns to 
the tenant. 
Of all four situations examined, that of the owner-operator is 
clearly preferable from all points of view, providing high incentive to 
invest and for labour input , and the greatest return to the tenant. 
However, if the political and other difficulties of land reform prevent 
or unduly delay the necessary land reform measures, legislation to replace 
the 50/50 rental basis with a fixed rent, abolishes the main impediments 
to increased productivity by giving the tenant the full return for any 
increased labour input and for any investment undertaken, thus greatly 
increasing the incentive to both. Further legislation intervention to 
a lower rental is, of course, beneficial to the tenant, but does not 
greatly affect the incentive factor. 
6.2 Insecurity of Tenure 
Insecurity of tenure is another problem that presses heavily 
on the tenant farmer and severely limits the incentive to increase 
productivity. In some of the individual tenure provinces, particularly 
in Shewa, Sidamo and Arussi, it is customary for the landlord or his 
agent to collect a special fee as an initial payment for leasing the 
land. Since tenants can be evicted arbitrarily after harvesting their 
standing crops, some landlords evict existing tenants in order to 
collect such fees from new prospective tenants. In most of these 
provinces, almost all lease agreements are verbal, leaving it up to the 
courts to choose between the landlord's and tenant's versions in case 
of dispute. 
Because of this insecurity, the tenants have very little 
incentive to make long term improvements on their holding in such areas 
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as the planting of long term crops such as coffee or fruit trees and the 
construction of buildings or other works, which would contribute to the 
productivity of the land or to the efficiency of convenien e of culti-
vation. Nor is it easy for credit agencies to extend credit to farmers 
who are liable to be unemployed after the first harvest of their tenancy. 
Draft legislation to regulate the landlord-tenant relationship 
has been put to the Parliament many times but was always rejected. The 
draft legislation had importent provisions which included: 
(a) A landlord would only be entitled to evict a 
tenant,subject to approval by the Tenancy 
Tribunal, if the tenant defaulted on his rent, 
caused damage to the holding, abandoned it, 
failed to follow an agreed plan or transferred 
it to another person. Eviction would also be 
permitted, with due compensation, if the land 
were required for the subsistence of the land-
lord's family, and the landlord or a member of 
his household wanted to cultivate it personally; 
or if it were to be used under large scale 
commercial farming techniques. 
(b) Clear definition of rights and obligations would 
be required in written form some specific 
modifications to the system of share cropping, 
reduction of excessive rental payments, fixing 
equitable rent and fixing the minimum and maxi-
mum duration of agreement . 
(c) Mortgage of lease. In order to obtain credit 
for the proper agricultural use the tenant would 
be able to change the agricultural lease 
with a mortgage, provided that the landlord's 
right in ownership of the holding or his 
share in the rent would not be affected by the 
non-payment of the loan. 
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Such a mortgage would only be created in favour of a credit 
institution approved by the responsible authorities for the purpose of 
extending credit to farmers for agricultural purposes (Proclamation, 
1971) . This draft legislation was not passed because it lacked political 
support. The lack of this or similar legislation severely limits the 
welfare of the tenant, and greatly reduces the incentive for increasing 
productivity in these provinces. 
6.3 Purpose of Credit and Form of Provision 
Credit is of most value where it enables production to increase 
and incomes to rise. This can be done in two main ways: 
(a) Increase the labour input nearer to Lp' 
(b) Increase the productivity of labour and/or land. 
Of these, as labour is mainly unpaid family labour, and usually not 
fully utilised under present conditions, increasing the labour input 
nearer to Lp will not normally depend on credit provision. But 
increasing the productivity of labour and/or land requires investmen t 
and this is facilitated by credit. 
Investment can be of two main types: 
(a) Labour saving. 
(b) Land saving, or it can be a combination of both. 
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6.3 . 1 Labour Saving 
This is achieved by the adoption of new techniques that save 
labour . This investment takes the form of improved farm irnplen~nts which 
can produce substantial improvemen ts in the productivity of labour in 
subsistence agriculture at very little cost. For example, CADU Research 
Implement Uni t has developed and tested an implement for seed bed 
preparation, including seed covering, which is vastly superior to the 
* traditional method. The fa rmer has to invest in a plough at $E40 and a 
harrow at $E30, totalling $E70 . The e stimated useful life of these 
implements is fo ur years and the annual depreciation thus $E17.50. It 
is estimated by CADU that i t will take one man and two oxen about 21.5 
working days to prepare one hectare using the traditional method while it 
** will take only 9. 5 days using CADU's method . 
6.3.2 Land Saving 
This type of improvement is achieved by devices such as the 
introduction of fertiliser, irrigation schemes, land improvements and 
conservation schemes. Such devices have the effect of raising the overall 
productivity of the land. The l and saving device is often neither simple 
no r cheap to introduce, and may require substantial assistance in the 
form of capital grants or credit from the advanced sector. 
6.4 Effects of t e Two Types of Investment 
6.4 . 1 Where Population Pressure is Low or Moderate 
Figure 6.5 shows the difference in the effect of the two types 
of innovative investment . The curve O-T represents the original 
a 
technology, and the curve O-Tb the effect of the labour saving investment; 
this does not increase the total product ive capacity of the land, but it 
* It is also superior in other ways that improve the productivity of the 
land and is thus also land saving. 
** Using a shadow price for labour of $E3/day for the man and the two 
oxen , the labour saving would be $E36 per hectare. 
R 
D 
D 
U 
C 
E 
o 
_-Ta 
LABOUR 
FIGURE 6.S 
EFFECTS OF TECHNOLOGY WHERE POPULATION PRESSURE IS 
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makes each individual level of production, up to the point where marginal 
returns fall to zero, accessible at a lower input of labour. Thus, the 
level of production D-D' can be achieved with the input of O-LA, labour 
instead of O-LA. As a corollary, when population pressure is low or 
moderate, as illustrated in Figure 6.5, the surplus SlSS'S'2 that can be 
produced with the full use of the labour available is raised from 
D'-S to D'-S' because the limitation in labour supply Lp is eased to 
this extent by the labour saving device, making the effect of the available 
labour Lp the equivalent of what would otherwise have required the higher 
(and unavailable) labour supply Lp '. 
The curve O-T , on the other hand, represents the effect of a 
c 
land saving type of innovative investment. Its effect is to increase the 
level of product attainable at any given input of labour, from the point 
on the curve O-T corresponding to that input, to the point vertgially 
a 
above it on the curve O-T . 
c 
In the case illustrated in Figure 6.5, where land is not scarce 
and population pr ssure on the land resource is low or moderate, either 
type of innovative investment can be of value , enabling a given level of 
product to be gained from the use of any given labour input. 
6.4.2 Where Population Pressure is high 
In the case illustrated in Figure 6.6, however, where land is 
scarce and population pressure on the land resource is high (as it is in 
the communal provinces), the labour saving innovation Tb is of little or 
no advantage, and only the land saving t ype of innovation T can greatly 
c 
improve the situation. Thus, in the individual tenure provinces, credit 
facilities should be made available both for labour and land saving 
types of innovative investment, but in the connnunal provinces, where 
population pressure is very high, priority should be given initially to 
credit for land saving investments. Subsequently, when these have been 
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effective, soneadvantage may be obtained from adding facilities for some 
lab our saving investments, but here these can only be considered as a 
cornplem ntary factor to land saving types; in the land abundant 
individual tenure provinces, land and labour saving investments can be 
considered as alternative strategies as well as complementary ones. 
Looking again at Figure 6.6, it can be seen that the labour 
saving device reduces slightly the labour input necessary to achieve the 
level of output D-D', but even when all the labour available Lp is fully 
employed, the minute surplus above D-D' (S SS'S') attainable is not 1 1 
increased by the labour saving investment O-Tb . In fact, 'f the cost of 
the investment is deducted, the net produc would be reduced. The land 
saving investment O-T
c
' however , transforms the situation and makes a 
real surplus (SlSS"S"2) accessible even at this high population pressure 
on land resources. 
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CHAPTER 7 
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
The purpose of this thesis has been to examine how productive 
credit can be applied to the problems of Ethiopian small farming both to 
raise the level of productivity and to i mprove the standard of living 
of the people. 
Production credit is a package approach, which only the 
Government can implement. This means that for its effective use, other 
services such as agricultural market i ng and agricultural extension have 
to be integrated with it by subsidising operating costs (at least at the 
initial stages) . 
Insistence on mortgage security for credit, where credit is 
necessary to p r oduce a large productive increase, is in favour of the 
large capitalist owner prepared to work his own lands (even as an 
absentee) and discriminates agains the small holder who cannot qualify 
for credit in that system. 
Direct factors, such as geographic inaccessibility, institutional 
requirements, the navailability of agronomic research results and 
production inputs, as well as the indi rect factors such as marketing 
deficiencies, the different priorities of development programs, low 
literacy rates, limited extension services and a lack of co-ordination 
between various levels of the bureaucracy - all inhibit the use of credit 
by small farmers . In lending policies, extension services, input prices 
and availability and repayment capacity are very i~ortant. Farmers within 
the MPP and Comprehensive Package projects were more adequately serviced 
than those outside these schemes. Those outside, the great majority, 
find it almost impossible to find credit, or even to appreciate the 
possibilities that adequate credit facilities can provide. 
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It has been shown that for these purposes, Ethiopia can be 
divided into two types of region: communal tenure provinces of the north 
and individual tenure provinces of the south. The differences of these 
two regions are so basic for any credit operation that they can best be 
treated separately. 
7.1 Communal Tenure Provinces 
7.1 .1 Tenurial Problems 
(a) Land is inalienable and thus cannot be mortgaged 
for security; this makes conventional bank lending 
difficult. 
(b) Tenure over any particular piece of land is always 
insecure because of the rights of others, who may 
have been away from the village for years, to 
return and claim land rights as a birthright right. 
This seriously reduces the incentive for any 
individual farmer to invest in any lasting improve-
ments in the land he is using. 
(c) Population pressure on the land. This problem, 
associated incidentally with th form of land tenure, 
has several results of vital importance to any 
credit program. 
Firstly, at present lev Is of technology and with 
present availability of inputs, there is very 
little scope for producing any surplus from which 
saving and investment may proceed. 
7 . 1.2 
Secondly, credit must be used for investment 
in land saving types of improvements; labour 
saving investments will be ineffective until 
productivity of land has been raised. There-
fore , for these communal tenure provinces 
certain policy recommendations have emerged. 
Security 
Loans have to be secured by means other than mortgages. 
The best is institutional arrangements to ensure that supply of inputs 
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are provided in time and at a right place and are properly used to turn 
it in 0 additional in orne. The loa payments could be deduct ed from 
sale proceeds by the appropriate institution. This requires supply of 
inputs, and technical advice through extension services, to be 
correlated with the supply of credit, preferably in the one institution. 
In addition, if the usual high cost of collecting repayments and 
interest installments is to be avoided, the supply of credit must be 
conditional on the compulsory sale of the product through an institution 
responsible for deducting the payments before forwarding the proceeds to 
the producer. 
7.1.3 Incentive 
Some legislative intervention is required to assure to the 
farmer the use of his land for at least a minimum period, say five years , 
after making any land saving improvements . Individual heritable tenure 
would do this very well, but in these crowded lands, wi t h low off-take 
of population into other types of employment this would have unacceptable 
disadvantages for those parts of the population that could not 
immediately be provided with land on such terms. Possible alternative 
strategies may have to be explored which would protect the interests of 
a farmer for, say, fiv years after making such improvements. 
141 
7.1 . 4 Uses of Credit 
Due to the overc r owding of the land, credit should first be 
confined to the provision of improvemen ts of a significantly land saving 
nature, .g., fertiliser, improved seed, fun gicides , pestidices, drainage, 
irrigation, mulching and so on . 
7. 2 Individual Tenure Provinces 
7. 2.1 Population Pressure 
Thus: 
7. 2.2 
In these provinces, population pressure is low or moderate. 
(a) The possibili ty of producing a surplus exists 
from which investments can be made, if adequate 
incentive exists. 
(b) Both land saving and labour saving types of 
improvements will tend to increase the level of 
production . 
Tenurial Problems 
The large majority of Ethiopia's tenant population receive no 
assistance from their landlords in cultivat ion. They must pay rent to the 
landlord often exceeding 50 per cent of any increase in output achieved 
through increased effort or use of modern inputs. They have no security 
against eviction and cannot expect compensation for any permanent 
improvements to their holdings. Unde r such conditions, almost 50 per 
cent of southern Ethiopia's peasants who operate fully rented holdings can 
scarcely be expected to ta1e part in the technological change into which 
Ethiopian agriculture is moving under the Package Projects. Therefore, 
for individual tenure provinces, the following policy recommendations 
emerge: 
(a) Immediate land reform, or if not practicable for 
logistical or political reasons, then the following 
should be considered. 
(b) Rent control: fixed rent instead of proportion . 
This and the level of rent charged are very 
important keys to farmers' incentives. 
(c) Legislate to give up to a maximum of five years' 
notice of termination of tenure. 
(d) Loans could be secured by making tenure agreements 
transferable under some circumstances, but for 
small holder credit the security outlined for the 
communal provinces above is far more suitable and 
effective. 
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Provided the above tenure remedies are applied , the incentive to invest 
will be adequate in these regions. As far as the uses of credit are 
concerned , it is not limited to the same extent as in overcrowded 
provinces, and credit for labour saving devices such as farm machinery 
will also contribute to increased productivity from the start. 
It is clear that Ethiopia's principal hope for economic 
development in the foreseeable future lies in the widest possible 
diffusion of modern agricultural technology. It is equally clear, 
however, that the introduction of this technology in the absence of an 
effective program of land reform will worsen the present distribution of 
income in Ethiopia's rural areas. This will happen because the present 
rate of eviction of tenants will be greatly acceler ated, and tenants will 
have little incentive to use modern agricultural inputs. 
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Without changes in peas an t a titudes and organ isation , important 
grass roots pressures will not emerge. Significant action will occur only 
where intensive domestic political pressure for measures of land reform 
develops . 
Recently, such pressures have built up and the winds of change 
in favour of radical land reform measures are appearing. Any judgment 
concerning this reform must take note of the man:land ratio, the existing 
system of organisation in agriculture, the prevailing institutional and 
technological conditions in the society. 
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APPENDIX A 
* THE MECHANIZED FARMERS 
Although this thesis concentrates upon small fanrers , some 
attention must be given to the big farmers who are characterized by 
mechanization. The resent expans ion of mechanized farming has occurred 
at the expense of the traditional farming. It has been es timated that 
35,000 peasants have been displaced by mechanization thus fa (Holmberg, 
1972). If the expansion of mechanization continues at its pre sent rate 
the number of peasants displaced by the end of this decade will number 
ab out 180 000. 
Mechanized farming includes some irrigated farming and some dry 
farming; in Ethiopia it is represented by about 3,200 farmers (Table A.l) , 
55 per cent of whom are in the province of Eritrea. Other provinces 
where mechanized farming is concentrated are: Shewa, 13 per cent; 
Begemdir, 11 per cent; Harargie, 7 per cent and Arussi, 5.4 per cent. 
The number of tractors in use in 1972 was 3,339. Ninety per cent of these 
factors were distributed throughout the above States as can be seen in 
App ndix Table A.l. The remaining ten per cent was spread over the other 
provinces. 
Irrigation is mostly practised in Eritrea. The total number of 
irrigation motor pumps in the country was 3,97llil 1972 of which 90 per 
cent were in Eritrea. Thus, the majority of mechanized farms in other 
provinces practise dry farming mainly for cereals, pulses, oilseeds or 
* Mechanized farmers are those farmers who have more than 4 hectares 
of land and use modern techniques such as tractors, fertilizers, new 
vari ties, etc . 
industrial crops. The irrigated farming in Eritrea is mainly for the 
production of vegetables. 
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The average size of a mechaniz d farm is 176 ha but there are 
considerable variations from one province to another. Thus, from an 
average size of 61 ha in Tigre province, we pass to an average size of 
965 ha in Wellega province. The reason for this variation is that land 
is scarce in Tigre province. For the whole country, the average area per 
tractor is 170 ha, increasing to 350 ha in Begemdir an d to 675 ha in 
Wellega provinces where farms are bigger. As a result of goven1mental 
encouragement to mechanization, these farmers have been enjoying invest-
ment incentives such as duty-free fuel, duty-free importation of tractors 
and other tax concessions. 
Commercial agriculture is confined mainly to big plan atlons 
and to only a few small holdings . Most of the big plantations are 
government concessions given to foreign or mixed foreign-Ethiopian 
companies. These plantations have so far concentrated on sugar, cotton, 
fruits and coffee production. 
Table A.2 shows the net returns per hectare on mechanized farms. 
The level of net income (total and per hectare) of a commercial farm would 
depend upon a variety of factors. Primarily it would depend upon weather, 
soil quality and crop price s and then it would depend upon the avail-
ability of inputs, including mechanization, as well as the location of 
the farm. The quality of the management would also significantly affect 
the net income realized from the farm. While, therefore, there must 
always be a great deal of variation in the return from land and investment 
in the case of commercial farms, a compilation of the farm studies of 
mechanized farms located in various areas (see Table A.2) suggests an 
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* average net income per hectare of at least $E150. It appears to be 
higher for commercial crops like coffee and cotton than for cereal crops. 
The best estimates of knowledgeable observers are that the average net 
income per hectare may be $E200-300 for cotton and coffee and $El50-200 
for other crops (Quenemoen, 1968). 
Initially attracted by its high productivity and profitability; 
government sponsorship of mechanization has resulted in social dislocation 
and the concentration of rural income in a small proportion of the 
population. It will be argued in this thesis that the expansion of credit 
facilities to benefit small farmers and increase their productivity would 
provide a better long-term agricultural policy. 
* According to the follow-up data collected by the Agro-Industrial Bank 
on its agricultural loans disbursed between August 1971 and February 1972, 
a total of 5,778 hectares had been brought under various crops with a 
total output of $El.9 million. This yields a gross revenue figure $E331 
per hectare. There were, of course, wide variations as between crops -
cotton, for example, was $El,484, chick peas $El,006, pepper $E854, 
lentils $E34l, harricot beans $E277, etc. (AIDB, 1971). 
TABLE A.1 
FARM MECHANIZATION IN ETHIOPIA, 1972 
Number of Area of Number of 
mechanized Number of Average Number of cultivated tractors 
No. Province farmers land irrigation size of farm hectares 
No. % in hectares No. % motor pumps in hectares 
per tractor 
1 Arussi 173 5.4 34,830 276 8.2 43 200 125 
2 Bale 22 0.7 6,080 43 1.3 2 276 141 
3 Begemdir 345 10.8 213,548 606 18.1 20 620 350 
4 Eritrea 1,759 55.0 64,861 710 21.2 3,645 366 91 
5 Gemu Goffa 19 0.6 4,049 38 1.1 1 214 107 
6 Gojj am 3 320 2 107 160 
7 Harargie 226 7.0 44 ,885 312 9.3 46 199 154 
8 I11ubabor 1 120 2 4 120 60 
9 Keffa 32 1.0 7,750 65 2.0 17 242 119 
10 Shewa 413 12.9 106,003 917 27 . 4 125 258 115 
11 Sidamo 53 1. 7 25,857 191 5.7 8 488 135 
12 Tigre 25 0.8 1,528 17 0.5 22 61 90 
13 We11ega 31 1.0 29,635 44 1.3 13 965 675 
14 We110 97 3.0 25,454 118 3.5 25 263 216 
TOTAL 3,199 100.0 564,920 3,339 100.0 3,971 176 169 
Source: Ministry of Agriculture , Planning and Programming Unit, 1972. 
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No. 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
Crop 
Teff 
Wheat 
Sesame 
Sorghum 
Cotton 
Teff and chick peas 
Sorghum 
Cotton 
Coffee 
TABLE A.2 
NET RETURNS PER HECTARE ON MECHANIZED FARMS, 1972 
Region 
Arussi 
Arussi 
Set it Humera 
(Begemdir) 
Setit Humera 
(Begemdir) 
Awash 
(Shewa) 
South of 
Addis Ababa 
South of 
Addis Ababa 
Middle Awash 
(Shewa) 
Keffa 
Yield 
per hectare 
(in quintals) 
8 
13 
5 
15 
12 
12 
35 
15 
8 
Price 
per quintal 
(in $E) 
32.2 
25.5 
48.2 
22.4 
53.0 
32.0 
22.4 
53.0 
150.0 
Cost of production 
per hectare 
(in $E) 
141 
166 
161 
101 
382 
230 
310 
520 
778 
Net income 
per hectare 
(in $E) 
117 
165 
85 
235 
254 
154 
468 
275 
422 
Source: Data compiled in the Planning Commission Office from various research studies, 1970. 
f-J 
\Jl 
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APPENDIX B 
Some data are here produced from such sources as are available 
from land tenure surveys, sample surveys undertaken by the Central 
Statistical Office, special investigations undertaken by the Depart ment 
of Land Tenure and other sources, covering what is known about payment of 
tithes, fees, land tax and rent. 
A farm is defined as an area (owned or leased) which is operated 
by one person or one nuclear family. This is the general definition used 
for all farms in Ethiopia. The average size of the household farm is 
small in all provinces but varies from one distr ct to another (see 
Table B.l). In many localities, farmers cannot obtain sufficient land to 
absorb the labour of their families. In such conditions of land shortage 
it is not surprising that farms are frequently dispersed over several 
separate pieces of land. No reliable s tudy has yet been made of the extent 
and effect of the fragmentation. 
No data are a ailable on the land ownership by size of land in 
Ethiopia. Data collected by the Central Statistical Office of National 
Sample Surveys (CSO, 1963-68), however, confirm the general impression 
that the average size of operated holding in almost all the provinces of 
Ethiopia is relatively small. The average area under crop per household 
was estimated to be 1.1 hectares for 1 provinces out of 14 in Ethiopia 
(Table B.l). These data suffer from various limitations. Firstly, the 
pr portions derived are based on small samples rather than a census. 
Secondly, they relate to cropped (and cultivated) land only, so that 
grazing, unutilised and fallow lands have not been included. Thirdly, 
the extent to which anyone individual has various parcels of cultivated 
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lands in different locations is not revealed. These data provide no clue 
whatsoever to the land ownership pattern. Finally and this is perhaps its 
most severe limitation, data collected were "based on measured fields only 
and as such tend to underestimate size of holdings. All fields, especially 
the big ones are not measured even though they were in the sam Ie" 
(National Sample Survey, 1963-67). 
However, small farmers in Ethiopia do not operate more than what 
the table shows and the data could be used for generalizations. 
Province 
Tigre 
Begemdir 
Gojjam 
We110 
We11ega 
Shewa 
Harargie 
Keffa 
I11ubabor 
Gemu Goffa 
Sidamo 
TOTAL 
TABLE B. 1 
AREA UNDER CROPS AND NUMBER OF HOLDINGS IN CERTAIN PROVINCES 1 
Total Area 
('000 ha) 
6,025 
8,025 
6,225 
9,350 
7,725 
8,200 
26,125 
5,350 
5,350 
3,950 
11,175 
97,500 
Number of 
holdings 
252,600 
189,500 
245,370 
404,600 
191,300 
670 , 700 
263,160 
224,050 
111,850 
114,300 
375,945 
3 , 043,375 
Total 
(ha) 
281,919 
250,183 
282, 008 
375,751 
218,902 
1,124,379 
297,994 
200,087 
75,724 
58,202 
194,625 
3,359,774 
ARE A U N D E R 
Average size 
of holdings 
(ha) 
1.12 
1.32 
1.15 
0.93 
1.14 
1.68 
1 .13 
0.89 
0.68 
0.51 
0.52 
1.10 
Source: Central Statistical Office, National Sample Surveys , 1963-67. 
1. 11 provinces out of 14. 
See also Table B.2 . 
C R 0 P S 
Percentage 
of total 
area 
5 
3 
5 
4 
3 
14 
1 
4 
1 
1 
2 
3 
~ 
V1 
.+::--
TABLE B.2 
FREQUENCY DISTRIBUTION OF CULTIVATED HOLDINGS IN ETHIOPIA BY SIZE IN SAMPLE SURVEY 
Size of cultivated holdings (in hectares) 
Province 
0.05 0.5-1 . 0 1.0-1.5 1.5-2.0 2.0-3.0 3 . 0-4.0 4.0-5.0 over 5.0 Total 
A. I~DIVIDUAL 
TENURE AREAS1 
1. Arussi 8 23 15 i4 20 10 6 4 100 
2. Gemu Goffa 73 19 2 2 100 
3. Harargie 45 31 11 5 5 1 1 1 100 
4 . Keffa 41 35 12 7 4 1 100 
5. Shewa 23 22 16 11 13 7 4 4 100 
6. \.Je11ega 29 36 14 10 7 2 1 1 100 
7. I11ubabor 32 37 14 7 3 2 5 100 
8. We110 55 25 11 3 4 2 100 
B. COMMERCIAL 
TENURE AREAS 
1. Begemdir 40 30 13 9 5 3 100 
2. Gojjam 27 27 18 12 10 2 1 3 100 
3. Tigre 45 23 16 5 6 4 1 100 
Source. Central Statistical Office, National Sample Survey, 1963-67. 
-
1. Excluding the provinces of Bale and Eritrea. 
f-J 
1Jl 
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APPENDIX C 
TENANCY 
(a) Payment of tithe and other fees by tenants to their landlords 
First we shall take up the information dealing with payment by 
Asrat (tithe) and extraction fees by landlords gathered from the group 
interview conducted in the course of General Land Tenure Surveys. In 
Table C.l the relevant data on the two aspects is presented. 
TABLE C.l 
PERCENTAGE DISTRIBUTION OF '\-lEREDAS IN VARIOUS PROVINCES IN 
WHICH TITHE AND FEES ARE PAID BY TENANTS TO THEIR LANDLORDS 
Individual Percentage of Percentage of Percentage of Weredas where tenure Weredas where Weredas where land province tithe is paid fees are paid taxes 
are paid 
Shewa 68.5 5.4 
Arussi 100 . 0 
Wello 71.4 57 .1 
Wellega 66.7 
Harargie 60.0 73.3 
Illubabor 62.5 
Keffa 11.1 5.6 
Gemu Go££a 22.2 
Sidamo 7.7 7 . 7 
Bale 28.6 
Source: Compilation of General Tenure Reports, 1971 
The payment of tithe is a practice that is followed in almost 
all the provinces. Although in Illubabor it is said that no tithe is 
collected, in most of the Weredas the tenants are asked to pay the land tax. 
Even though tithe and land tax are different, both were dues to be paid by 
the landmmers to the State. Therefore, one could conclude that in all 
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the provinces the tenants are asked indirectly by their landlords to con-
tribute to the latter's dues to the Stat . However, as could be seen 
from the above table, the incidence of this type of p yment is dI f ferent 
from province to province. 
Broadly speaking, in all the central provinces, namely Shewa, 
Wello, Arussi, Wellega, Harargie and Illubabor, this phenomenon is wide-
spread while in the other four provinces, ~z., Keffa, Gemu Goffa, Sidamo 
and Bale, the extent of this practice is limited only to a few Weredas. 
The former group of first six provinces has relatively more land under 
cultivation than the second group of four provinces, where there is more 
government land than private land. 
(b) Mode of rent payment 
Since these surveys were no conducted in Bale province, the data 
on mode of rent payment is available only for nine provices : 
Province 
Shewa 
Arussi 
Wello 
Wellega 
Harargie 
Illubabor 
Keffa 
Gemu Goffa 
Sidamo 
TABLE C.2 
PERCENTAGE DISTRIBUTION OF LEASES ACCORDING TO 
MODE OF PAYING RENT 
In crop In cash In crop 
and cash 
82 15 3 
92 7 1 
84 9 6 
48 37 12 
47 42 11 
25 66 9 
31 64 5 
18 66 6 
12 85 3 
In 
service 
1 
3 
10 
Source: The compilation of the General Land Tenure Survey Reports 
of the Non-communal Provinces, 1974. 
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In some of the provinces (Table C.2) the payment of rent is 
usually in kind while in others payment in cash predominates. In the 
former category are the provinces of Shewa, Arussi, Wello, Wellega and 
Harargie and in the latter category can be included Illubabor, Keffa, 
Gemu Goffa and Sidamo. 
In those rich and stable southern agricultural provinces where 
the demand for land is high, the landlords are in a position to extract 
high rents. They normally can insist on payment of rent as an agreed 
share of gross produce. But in the provinces which have not yet experienced 
scarcity of agricultural land, the tenants are in a relatively better 
bargaining position and therefore t he landlords are compelled to agree on 
payment of rent in cash which will be advantageous for the tenants. 
From four of the provinces there is some information available 
on the shares of gross . produce going as rent. In Table C.3, details of 
share rent (payment in kind) payment in Shewa, Arussi, Wello and Wellega 
are provided: 
Province 
Shewa 
Arussi 
Wello 
Wellega 
TABLE C.3 
PERCENTAGE DISTRIBUTION OF SHARE CROPPING LEASES 
A CORDING TO THE SHARE OF PRODUCE GOING AS RENT 
Oxen supplied by landlords' 
share of produce being 
Oxen not supplied by land-
lords' share of produce being 
Less than 
50% 
5 
4 
2 
4 
50% or more 
21 
10 
14 
Less than 
50% 
90 
53 
35 
68 
Source: National Sample Surveys, 1963-68. 
50% or more 
5 
22 
53 
14 
In the Central Statistical Office reports on Shewa and Arussi 
a more detailed breakdown of shares of produce being paid as rent is 
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provided. Even though the largest proportion of sh re croppers are reported 
to be paying only less than half of their produce as rent, most of them pay 
at least one-third of their produce as rent. Since in the maj ority of 
provinces a large proportion of tenants pay tithe, in effect a considerable 
proportion of tenants pay 40 per cent of the produce from their land as rent. 
Only a very few landlords contribute anything other than land. Some pay 
tithes, but few contribute inputs such as plough cattle, seed, etc. 
According to the Central Statistical Office information, in 
9 per cent of the leases contracted in all the provinces, bullocks are 
s upplied by landlords. In such cases, the share rent is generally one-half 
of the produc or mor. Ev n when the landlords do not supply hullo ks 
it is seen from the data from Arussi and Wello that many of the tenants pay 
half of their produce or more as rent, and tithes in addition. 
(c) The type of lease · agreements 
Security of tenure and other aspects of tenancy relationships 
are determined by the type of lease agreements entered upon between the 
tenants and their landlords. Therefore, an analysis of lease agreements 
is a crucial part of any study of tenancy conditions. 
According to the National Sample Survey (1963-68) conducted by 
the Central Statistical Office, 90 per cent of leases are verbal, 6 per 
cent written and the remaining are unspecified. When an overwhelmingly 
larg proportion of the lease agreements are only verbal it is obvious 
that th tenants will not have any security of tenure. 
The predominance of verbal lease agreements is also revealed by 
h d tailed land t nure studies. The information relating to this 
aspect is set out in Table C.4: 
TABLE C.4 
PERCENTAGE DISTRIBUTION OF LEASES ACCORDING TO THEIR TYPE 
IN TWO SELECTED REGIONS 
Region Verbal Written 
Shewa 84 
Sidamo 99 
Source : Ministry of Land Reform, Land Tenure 
Department , 1970. 
16 
1 
In both the regi~ns the lease agreements are most ly verbal . 
However, there is some marked difference between the r egions of 
Shewa and Sidamo. While Shewa report s 16 per cent of such lease 
agreements , in Sidamo only 1 per cent of lease agreements are written . 
This has been a result of the fact t hat Shewa has more development 
projects than the f ar southern province. Thus, there are better 
employment alternat ives in Shewa. 
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TABLE D. 1 
DISTRIBUTION OF TRADITIONAL LOANS BY PURPOSE FOR EACH PROVINCE 
TIGRE ILLUBABOR SIDAMO KEFFA SHEWA GOJJAM 
Purpose No . $E No. $E No. $E No. $E No. $E No. $E 
of av of av of av of av of av of av 
loans size loans size loans size loans size loans size loans size 
1. Purchase of food 97,086 18 54,400 13 23,700 23 69,055 16 172,790 20 58,090 18 
2. Purchase of clothing 15,800 16 3,800 14 16,100 18 18,050 13 45,800 24 9,600 19 
3. Payment of med . exps. 2,600 22 2.800 18 9,800 36 5,755 29 14,466 45 900 46 
4. Payment of house or 
building materials 300 37 700 81 1,900 192 4,970 80 4,460 122 1,000 25 
5. Exp. on ceremonies 400 21 2,800 58 11,700 54 8,380 37 52,510 63 2 , 400 33 
6. Payment of tax 5,100 15 6,320 12 33 , 400 27 18,105 15 29,285 34 10,620 14 
7. Purchase of land 200 35 700 149 1,000 95 4,200 62 5,315 165 200 135 
8. Purchas e of lives tock 5,600 47 2,200 85 2,200 28 6,435 36 21,285 57 9,290 39 
9. Purchase of seeds, 
tools, h/h eqpt . 8,200 15 4,600 11 400 6 2,355 11 47,500 16 4,900 14 
10. For trading 2,600 73 400 110 4,000 62 5 , 410 75 22,880 150 2,290 68 
11 . Other reasons 11, 100 38 4,320 85 41,400 65 19,435 60 89,945 55 8,650 37 
12. Not state d 800 14 200 57 100 5 150 35 3 2,110 19 700 28 
TOTAL 149 , 785 21 63,240 23 145,700 43 162,300 29 508,346 39 108,64·0 22 
~ 
I-d 
PERCENTAGE 8.0 4.4 7.7 8.5 25.6 5.6 I~ 
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A££endix D - Table D.1 (continued): 
HARARGIE BEGEMDIR ARUSSI GEMU GOFFA BALE WELLO WELLEGA 
No. $E No. $E No. $E No. $E No. $E No. $E No. $E 
of av of av of av of av of av of av of av 
loans size loans size loans size loans size loans size loans size loans size 
1 . 68,526 31 93,455 18 31,600 21 19,930 13 15,485 35 47,030 31 48,110 15 
2. 10,958 17 1,500 12 6,900 17 4,610 22 3,965 19 4,825 17 6,155 15 
3. 2,783 50 2,700 20 1,100 23 1,900 23 920 39 550 20 4,020 29 
4. 600 163 1,400 48 200 5 300 100 625 35 315 53 3,305 54 
5. 10,097 58 3,400 25 3,200 26 1, 780 36 1,730 42 2,285 26 8,863 44 
6. 14,870 30 18,100 12 3,700 28 29,775 16 5,400 39 10,645 20 17,310 19 
7. 542 246 300 110 600 70 300 23 300 58 265 238 700 41 
8. 2,201 64 17,700 41 1,700 31 300 20 1,435 56 6,295 70 3,060 41 
9. 1,037 23 11,500 14 7,700 15 1,500 7 1,200 30 860 8 4,545 10 
10. 600 350 6,100 103 2,100 87 1,200 75 1,265 73 2,325 82 3,085 51 
11. 10,527 16 23,425 34 9,900 36 7,205 33 5,685 157 5,455 69 13,110 28 
12. 1,100 16 900 47 500 53 800 32 1,315 21 140 33 
123,841 38 180,480 24 69,200 25 69,600 19 38,010 55 82,165 27 148,110 21 
6.S 10.2 3.6 3.6 2.0 6.5 7.8 
Source: Central Statistical Office, Second Round National Sample Surveys, 1963-68. 
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